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Many years ago a mighty rumbling was heard from a
mountain, which was said to be in labour. Thousands of
people flocked from far and near to see what it would produce.
After a long time of waiting in anxious expectation-out
popped a mouse!1
INTRODUCTION
A company gives an employee (E) a cellular phone to use on
company matters. The phone is programmed to send and receive
text messages. E is told that he may send and receive up to a
certain number of alphanumeric characters per month, with no
cost to E. The company makes a point of informing E that it
reserves the right to review his use of the phone, including the
text messages he sends and receives. Informally, however, his
supervisor tells him that the company will not enforce this policy;
instead, personal use of the phone and text messaging will be
permitted, so long as E pays for any text message use that exceeds
the contractual character limit per month. Does this informal
understanding give E a right to privacy in the personal text
messages he sends and receives? If so, and the company decides to
review E's text messages, does it matter why the company did so?
And what about the people who send text messages to E, and
receive messages from him-do they have any right to privacy
against the company's review of the messages? Does it matter
whether those with whom E texts are aware that E is using a
company phone, rather than his personal phone?
Suppose instead E works for a government agency-local,
city, state, or federal. Would the privacy issues raised in the
1 The Mountain in Labour, in AESOP'S FABLES 31 (Jack Zipes ed., 1992).
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previous paragraph be resolved any differently? If so, how and
why?
The Supreme Court confronted these issues in 2010 in City of
Ontario v. Quon.2 Sergeant Jeff Quon sued his employer, the
Ontario Police Department, when he learned that the OPD
reviewed the text messages he had sent and received on a
department-issued pager.3 The Ninth Circuit entered judgment
for Quon; 4 the city appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court's
decision in that case touches on a wide range of social,
technological, and legal issues, including: (1) the role various
electronic communications media play in our lives; (2) whether a
government employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
when he uses equipment or systems provided by the government
agency for which he or she works; (3) when, assuming such an
expectation exists, the government employer is nevertheless
justified in intruding upon that privacy; and (4) the legal standard
against which those expectations and justifications are to be
measured.
Quon is the third time the Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of a government employee's right to workplace privacy from
the agency that employs him or her. The first was O'Connor v.
Ortega,5 decided in 1987. That decision recognized an employee's
rights to privacy, but provided no clear guidance as to how those
rights are to be measured; 6 nor did the second decision, National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,7 decided in 1989, because
although Van Raab did involve the employer-employee
relationship, it is better understood when viewed from a different
legal perspective. 8 When the Court granted cert in Quon,
2 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). Quon involved an
alphanumeric pager, rather than a cell phone with texting capability. Cell phones with
text-message capacity are probably now far more widely owned and used than pagers,
and the issues presented by the text messages in Quon would apply equally to text
messages sent by phone.
3 Id. at 2621-22.
4 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008). See infra
Part I.A and Part JI.C for a more detailed discussion of the district court and circuit
court decisions.
5 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
6 See infra Part II for an extensive discussion of O'Connor.
7 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
8 See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text for discussion of Von Raab.
1362 [VOL. 81:5
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
therefore, many scholars, judges, and practitioners hoped that the
Quon decision would clarify the uncertainties left over from
O'Connor and resolve new issues created by electronic
communications technology. On the other hand, some observers
feared that the Court in Quon might issue a broad, sweeping
decision that could have a substantial, unforeseeable, and perhaps
unfortunate impact on emerging communications technologies. As
it turned out, Quon decided very little, and leaves the law more
unsettled than it previously was.
This Article will begin with a very brief overview of
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles and federal statutory
regulation of electronic surveillance of communications. Part II
consists of a detailed look at O'Connor v. Ortega, and the
uncertainties the decision created in the law. Part III will examine
the Quon case, and analyze what the Court did decide. Part IV
examines the issues in Quon that the Court did not decide. Part V
states my conclusions as to where the decision leaves the law. The
Article ends with an "user's guide" to Quon, which outlines how
litigants and judges should attempt to apply Quon if presented
with a case involving privacy in the government or private sector
workplace.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RELEVANT FEDERAL
STATUTES
A. Fourth Amendment
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.9
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2012]1 1363
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It is clear from the language of the amendment that, to
determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it is
necessary to define its key terms: "search" and "seizure."
Application of the term "seizure" to some forms of electronic
surveillance raises difficult questions,o but for purposes of this
Article, its application is fairly straight-forward: a seizure occurs
when someone acquires physical possession of either a printed or
an electronic copy of a communication such as an e-mail, text
message, etc.
One major focus of this Article is what constitutes a "search"
in the workplace. Until the mid-1960s, legal definitions of
"search," for Fourth Amendment purposes, focused upon whether
a government investigator had intruded or trespassed upon a
"constitutionally protected area."ii The prevailing doctrine was
10 For example, is a phone call "seized" if it is overheard by someone listening in on
an extension phone or wiretap, or only when it is recorded? For a discussion of this
issue, see CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 1:5 (3d. ed. 2007). Federal and
state statutes regulating electronic surveillance finesse the issue by regulating, not the
"seizure" of communications, but their "interception," which is defined broadly to
include any "real time" acquisition of the contents of wire communications (i.e.,
telephone conversations), oral communications (i.e., face-to-face conversations), and
electronic communications (i.e., e-mails, tweets, etc.), by means of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006) (definition of "intercept").
For a detailed analysis of this definition and related terms, see id. at §§ 2:61-2:110.
" See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 ("What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within
a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile."). The Court considered whether the government violated defendant
Hoffa's Fourth Amendment rights when Edwin Partin, an acquaintance of Hoffa's,
gained entrance to Hoffa's hotel room by concealing the fact that he was acting as a
government informant. The Court held that no violation occurred because when Hoffa
admitted Partin he assumed the risk that Partin might be an informant (Partin's
testimony played a central role in convicting Hoffa of tampering with the jury in the
case for which he had been on trial.). For a detailed discussion of the Hoffa case, see
VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 418-24 (1971); see also Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963). Lopez offered a bribe to IRS agent Davis to help resolve a tax
matter; thereafter Davis went to Lopez's office, ostensibly to seal the deal, carrying a
wire recorder which recorded the conversation. In upholding the admissibility of the
recording, the Court commented that the Fourth Amendment protected against
surreptitious electronic overhearing "only [if] the electronic device [is] planted by an
unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area," Lopez, 373 U.S. at 348-
439, and held that because Lopez had invited Davis into his office, there had been no
unlawful "invasion" of the office. Id.; see also Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142
(1962) (holding that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to surreptitiously record
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that a Fourth Amendment "search" occurred only if the
government physically intruded into such an area and thereby
breached the defendant's "right to privacy."' 2
In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Court rejected this
"formulation" of what the Fourth Amendment protected.' 3 Rather,
Justice Stewart stated in his majority opinion:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ...
[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.14
Thus, the Court held that when Katz closed the glass door to a
public phone booth, although he was visible to the public, the
Fourth Amendment protected what he said from the uninvited
listener.15
defendant's conversation with his brother in the visitors' room of a public jail, because
that location was not a "constitutionally protected area.").
12 The phrase "right to privacy" has a long and storied history. The phrase became
common in American legal jurisprudence as a result of Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis's famous article, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). That
article is considered by many legal scholars to be the seminal work in the area of
privacy rights and is still cited over a hundred years later. See, e.g., Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2000); Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201,
1206 (11th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 526 (Cal. 2011); Tarlton v.
Kaufman, 199 P.3d 263, 273 (Mont. 2008) (Morris, J., dissenting). Interestingly
enough, the phrase, "right to privacy," has also had its detractors. See Erin Miller,
Justice Stevens and the So-called Right to Privacy, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES BLOG (May 21, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/justice-
stevens-and-the-so-called-right-to-privacy/ (noting that the phrase "so called 'right to
privacy"' first appeared in a 1902 decision by New York's highest court).
13 Justice Stewart wrote:
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place the
correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted
by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right
to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain
kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution
protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
14 Id. at 351.
15 Id. at 358-59.
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Justice Harlan, concurring, pointed out that it is usually
difficult to apply the Fourth Amendment without reference to the
place in which the government surveillance occurred.16 He read
the Court's prior decisions as creating the rule that to enjoy
Fourth Amendment intrusion from government surveillance,
"there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'"7 Although the Katz majority rejected the concept
that Fourth Amendment protection and "privacy" were equivalent
concepts,' 8 the Supreme Court has since adopted the second part
of Justice Harlan's formulation, and has held on several occasions
that the Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable (or
legitimate) expectations of privacy,' 9 although in 2001, the Court
acknowledged that the reasonable expectation of privacy test "has
been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable."20
2. Situations in which a Person Surrenders his Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized a variety
of situations in which a person loses what otherwise would be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court articulated one such
situation in Katz: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
16 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1s Id. at 350; see supra text accompanying note 13.
19 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (holding defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out on the curb for collection);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that it did not intrude into
Smith's reasonable expectation of privacy when the phone company made a record of
the numbers he dialed from his home phone and turned the information over to the
police).
20 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). The Court, per Justice Scalia, held
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy against government use of
surveillance equipment to learn any information about the inside of his home, at least
if the equipment was not readily available to the general public, and therefore the use
of a thermal imaging device to measure the amount of heat emanating from Kyllo's
home was a search which, in the absence of a search warrant, violated that
expectation. Id.
1366 [VOL. 81:5
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even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."21
Second, if a person consents to a search, the search is
lawful.22 The validity of consent is based on an assessment of all of
the relevant circumstances. 23 In reality the term "consent" is a
misnomer. The Supreme Court has held that a person's "consent"
to a search is valid even though the officer did not inform the
person of his right to refuse. 24 In essence, the officer may exploit
the suspect's ignorance and the inherently coercive nature of the
police-civilian encounter.25 It suffices that---considering a totality
of the circumstanceS26-- the officer obtained the person's
acquiescence to the search without engaging in overtly coercive
conduct.27 The consent-to-search concept also applies in the
sometimes coercive employer-employee context as well. 2 8
Third, whenever a person confides in someone else, he
assumes the risk that individual is now working with or may later
disclose the confidence to the authorities.29
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see also United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) ("In a society based on law, the concept of agreement
and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full
accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for
the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance
on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of
coercion.").
23 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
24 Id.; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203.
25 The Court has never explicitly stated, but this is the clear implication of cases
such as Florida v. Bostic, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991). In Bostic, the defendant quite
plausibly argued that no one in his right mind would consent to a search, knowing the
police would find contraband, and the defendant's acquiescence to the search therefore
must have been coerced. Id. at 435. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
whether the police acted coercively was to be viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable, innocent person in the defendant's situation. Id. at 437-38.
26 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
27 See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
28 See infra Part IILA.
29 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963). In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court held that an
undercover agent did not violate White's Fourth Amendment rights when he
surreptitiously transmitted to other agents his conversations with White in a variety of
locations, including White's home.
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B. Statutory Regulation of Surveillance of Communications
1. Title III
Congress responded to Katz and another Supreme Court
decision, Berger v. New York,30 by enacting Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.31 Designed
to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications,3 2 Title III
made it a crime for private persons to intercept such
communications, and forbade law enforcement officials to do so
without a court order,33 usually referred to as an "interception
order." The legislation mandates that to obtain such an order, the
prosecutor must submit an application to a judge that satisfies not
only the Fourth Amendment requirements for a search warrant,
but several additional conditions as well. 3 4 For example, an
interception order may not be submitted to a federal judge unless
it is first approved by a high-level official of the U.S. Department
of Justice;35 applications by state officials to a state judge must
first be approved by the state attorney general, the county's chief
prosecutor, or specific assistants designated by them.36 An
interception order may be sought and issued only where probable
cause exists37 for particularly serious, statutorily designated
crimes.38 The application must establish that other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed, would be unlikely to
30 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Court held New York's wiretapping statute
unconstitutional because it was overly broad, lacked particularization with regard to
what conversations could be listened to, authorized the indiscriminate use of electronic
devices, and allowed for extension of the eavesdropping based solely on a showing that
an extension was in the public interest. Id.
31 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
S2 Electronic communications were added to the statute as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.
33 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2006).
3 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). For an exhaustive discussion of this
provision, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, chs. 8-11.
35 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (wire and oral communications); see FISHMAN &
McKENNA, supra note 10, § 8:5. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (2006) (electronic
communications); see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, § 8:6.
36 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2006); see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 8:7-8:11.
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b), 2518(3)(a), (b), (d) (2006); see FISHMAN & McKENNA,
supra note 10, §§ 8:53-8:70.
8 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) (federal orders); 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (state orders); see
FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 8:35-8:40.
1368 [VOL. 81:5
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succeed, or would be too dangerous.39 The orders must be executed
to "minimize the interception" of communications unrelated to the
crimes being investigated. 40
Where a participant to the communication consents to its
interception, however, the interception is lawful and no court
order is needed. 41
2. The ECPA and SCA
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA).42 As its title implies, a primary purpose of
ECPA was to protect the privacy of electronic communications
from unauthorized acquisition by either private individuals or
government agents. 43
A major component of ECPA are provisions, codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-11, which regulate the disclosure of stored
electronic communications such as e-mails and text messages.
These provisions are often referred to as the "Stored
Communications Act" (SCA).44 The SCA makes it a crime to access
stored wire or electronic communications without legal
authorization. 4 5 Penalties for violating the statute range from six
39 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2006) (application); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (order); see
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 8:71-8:92.
40 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006); see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 8:101-
8:107.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006) (interceptions with the consent of a participant are
lawful if made "under color of law"); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (interceptions by private
individuals with the consent of a participant are lawful so long as the interception was
not done for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort); see FISHMAN & MCKENNA,
supra note 10, ch. 5.
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701-11, 3117, 3121-37 (2006).
43 Among other things, ECPA amended Title III, see supra Part I.B, to make it a
crime, and civilly actionable, for a private person or entity to intercept electronic
communications as they are being transmitted. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2006).
44 An astute reader (or one with nothing better to do) may have noticed that
although the SCA and ECPA are both statutes, I refer to them as "the SCA" (with a
"the") and "ECPA" (without a "the"). I do so because when "ECPA" is referred to aloud,
it is usually pronounced as if it was a word-"Eck-pa"-without the "the," while the
SCA is pronounced "the S-C-A."
4 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006); see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 7:10-
7:12. Where an employer is the service provider of an e-mail system for its employees,
however, the employer may access stored or archived e-mail messages without the
knowledge or permission of employees. This is so because 18 U.S.C. § 2701(1)(c)
permits the service provider to do pretty much what it wants with regard to stored
1370 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5
months' to two years' imprisonment and fines ranging from $5000
to $250,000.46 It is also unlawful for an individual or entity
involved in the transmission or storage of the communication to
improperly divulge the contents of such a communication. 4 7
Unauthorized access to or divulgence of stored communications is
also civilly actionable. 48
The scope of the SCA was an important issue at the Quon
trial and on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.49 Although the Supreme
Court declined to grant certiorari on the statutory issues,50 the
Court did discuss the relevance of the statute to the issues on
which it did grant cert.51
3. Other Legislation
Congress has enacted other statutes protecting
communicational privacy and regulating government access to
private communications, 5 2 but these statutes do not play a role in
the Quon case, and this Article will offer no discussion of them.
53
communications. See FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, § 7:21. However, this
situation did not apply in Quon, because the communications service was provided by a
corporate ISP, Arch Wireless Operating Company.
46 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (2006); see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, § 7:13.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006); see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 7:33-7:34.
48 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2006); see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, § 7:30. The
statute likewise spells out the circumstances in which the government may obtain
access to such communications as part of a criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(2006); see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 7:45-7:55. Depending on the
circumstances, the government may proceed either by search warrant, by subpoena, or
by court order; the customer whose electronic "storage bin" is being pierced may receive
prior notice that the government seeks access to stored records, thereby enabling the
customer to move to quash the action; or he may receive notice only after the
government has already obtained the records; or he may not receive notice at all. 18
U.S.C. § 2705 (2006); see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 7:57-7:58. These
latter portions of the statute are not relevant to the Quon case, because the Ontario
Police Department, Quon's employer, was not conducting a criminal investigation
against Quon.
49 See infra note 158.
50 See infra Part III.D.
51 See infra Part III.E.4.
52 Government use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices to record the
numbers dialed by a particular phone, and the source of calls to that phone, is
regulated by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), (d) and (e) and 18 U.S.C. § 3121-27; see generally
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, ch. 4. Federal statutes protecting computer
privacy include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). For
detailed coverage of that and other computer-related legislation, see generally
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C. Measuring the Validity of a Search
If a court concludes that government agents have conducted a
Fourth Amendment search, the question then becomes whether
the search was lawful. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
all searches and seizures, it protects against only those which are
unreasonable. 54 Other than the general requirement that to be
lawful a search must not be "unreasonable," the only explicit
guidance the amendment provides is that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."55 The
amendment does not define probable cause; nor does it explicitly
state whether a search may be reasonable in the absence of
probable cause; nor does it specify when a warrant is required.
1. The Warrant Requirement and Probable Cause
As to the latter issue, the operative clich6 is that "as a
general matter, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment," subject to "a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions" to that general rule. 56
The Court has said so in almost exactly the same words twenty-
four times57-once for each blackbird baked in the nursery rhyme
pie.5 8 But "saying it's so doesn't make it so."59 In fact, the
FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, ch. 25. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12, regulates (among other things) the use of
electronic surveillance of communications for national security purposes. See generally
FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, ch. 12 (Incidentally, this statute is generally
pronounced "FIE-SUH" and is not preceded by a "the."). States have also passed
legislation regulating the interception of communications and related subjects. For
extensive coverage of these statutes, see generally id. §§ 1-11, 13-41.
53 The footnotes in Parts I.B and 1.C may set a new world's record for frequency of
professorial self-citation per word of text; if not, I'll bet they come close.
54 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55 Id.
-6 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57 Anyone interested in the complete list need only do a Westlaw search, data base
U.S. Supreme Court, for the phrase "per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." A search including minor variations on this phrase would no doubt
produce additional cases.
58 The first two lines of the rhyme read, "Sing a song of six pence, a pocket full of
rye. Four-and-twenty blackbirds baked in a pie." For the full text of the rhyme, its
history (apparently at one time, enclosing live birds inside a pie was a popular custom),
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exceptions to the warrant requirement are many rather than
few, 60 and some are not at all well-delineated, 6 1 as even a
superficial perusal of the leading treatises on the Fourth
Amendment will quickly reveal. 62 The vast majority of searches
conducted by government agents are lawful despite the absence of
a warrant;63 a substantial number of these are lawful despite the
theories concerning its deeper meaning, and cultural references to it in literature and
popular culture (my reference to it in this Article enrolls me in a roster of luminaries
including, among others, William Shakespeare and Paul McCartney), see Sing a Song
of Sixpence, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NURSERY RHYMES 394-95 (lona Opie &
Peter Opie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d. ed. 1997) (1951); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
TWELFTH NIGHT act 2, sc. 3; THE BEATLES, Blackbird, on THE BEATLES (Apple Records
1968).
59 I tried to find the original source for this phrase. My edition of BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS did not list it in the index. A Google search produced 14,600
hits. I examined the first several; none cited the original source. I would have dutifully
continued down the list, but my wife insisted that I help put away the Passover dishes.
60 Examples: search of the person incident to arrest; search of the area incident to
arrest; stop-and-frisks; searches conducted during hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect;
searches conducted to prevent the impending destruction of evidence; searches of
vehicles; searches of containers in vehicles; consent searches; and an impressive
variety of inspection, regulatory, and other "special needs" searches. See discussion
infra Part I.C.2.
61 Consider, for example, the search-of-the-area incident to arrest doctrine first
announced in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), in which the Court held that
at least in some circumstances, after the police have arrested someone within a
premises, they may search the immediate area for weapons or destructible evidence.
Lower courts have debated ever since whether the right to conduct such a search
continues after the arrestee has been secured and moved to a different location. The
Supreme Court returned to that issue in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), a case
involving the search of an automobile, in which the plurality and dissenting opinions
each cited Chimel more than twenty times, without clarifying the issue much, if at all.
62 See, e.g., THOMAS CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION ch. 6 (2008) (discussing arrests and seizures of persons, only a small
fraction of which require a warrant); id. ch. 8 (discussing searches incident to arrest,
virtually none of which require a warrant); id. ch. 9 (discussing protective weapons
searches and sweeps, none of which require a warrant); id. ch. 10 (discussing
automobile and consent searches, few if any of which require a warrant); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT chs. 6-10 (4th
ed. 2004) (discussing these same topics).
63 I do not intend to cite any particular source to defend this statement; anyone
who practices criminal law or teaches Criminal Procedure-I've done one or the other
for more than forty years-knows it is true (Consider, by analogy, FED. R. EVID. 201(b),
which permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is "generally
known within the court's geographic jurisdiction."). Law review editors and judges and
attorneys who practice or adjudicate in other areas of law, please keep in mind that the
assertion to which this footnote is attached is merely background information in the
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lack of probable cause. 64 Probably a more accurate statement
would be that as a general rule, warrants based on probable cause
are required to authorize the police to make a non-consensual
entry into a home, office or other private premises; to search
someone's mail; to open some packages; and to intercept oral, wire
or electronic communications without the consent of a
participant.65
2. Administrative, Regulatory, and Other "Special Needs"
Searches
The government is often called upon to conduct searches in
contexts unrelated (or at least not directly related) to criminal law
enforcement. These are sometimes referred to as "special needs"
searches. 66 The Court has long recognized that the reasonableness
of such searches and seizures, conducted outside the traditional
criminal law enforcement context, must be measured by standards
different from those that apply in criminal cases.67 The Court has
upheld the applicability of this doctrine to inspections of homes68
and business locations;69 and to border searches70 of mail,71
introductory section of the Article. I respectfully request you simply take my word for
its accuracy.
64 See supra note 63.
65 See supra note 63.
66 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628, 2630 (2010) (using the
phrase and citing other cases in which it appears).
67 Each of the cases cited in the next ten footnotes so holds.
68 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that a warrant is
required before police may search a home pursuant to fire, health, and housing code
inspection programs, but that such warrants need not be based on probable cause of
criminal wrongdoing or code violations; rather, they may be issued pursuant to
reasonable administrative or legislative standards).
69 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that where a
business is closely regulated by the state, searches by the police without a warrant are
permissible if carefully limited in time, place, and scope); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that a warrant could be issued to search a business
location if issued on the basis of a general administrative plan based on neutral
principles).
70 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) ('That searches made at the
border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping
and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply
by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended
demonstration.").
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automobiles,72 and individuals;73 to sobriety checkpoints; 74 and
regulations requiring drug tests of school children,75 law
enforcement officials, 76 and mass transit employees.77 The Court
has rejected the application of "special needs" standards with
regard to drug interdiction roadblocks,78 and to regulations
71 Id. at 623-24. In Ramsey, the Court upheld a statute authorizing customs
officials to search first class mail coming from overseas whenever reason existed to
suspect it might contain contraband.
72 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004) (upholding border agents'
removal, disassembly, and search of a vehicle's gas tank despite the lack of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that it contained contraband).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2006) directs that
"all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to
detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such
regulations [promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury]." In Montoya de Hernandez,
the Court held that where customs agents "reasonably suspect" that a traveler has
swallowed contraband in an attempt to smuggle it into the country in her digestive
system, the traveler may be detained until the suspicion is verified or dispelled, i.e.,
until she submits to an X-ray or, if she refuses, until she has a bowel movement.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
7 Mich. Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that, given the
magnitude of the drunk driving problem, sobriety checkpoints that subjected all
motorists to a very brief detention was constitutional).
75 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding a school
regulation requiring all students seeking to participate in interscholastic athletics to
submit to random drug testing); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
(upholding a similar regulation regarding all students seeking to participate in any
extracurricular activities). In each case the Court held that the school district had
documented a serious problem with drug use among children, and that the testing
regime was reasonably calculated to help address the problem. In Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), however, the Court held that, even
though "the [public] school setting 'requires some modification of the level of suspicion
of illicit activity needed to justify a search,"' it was unreasonable for an assistant
principal who suspected that a thirteen-year-old middle school student possessed over-
the-counter pain relief pills to compel the child to submit to a virtual strip search. Id.
at 2639, 2641-43 (internal citations omitted).
76 Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See infra notes 121-22
and accompanying text for further discussion of Von Raab.
77 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 611 (1989) (holding that it was
reasonable "to require [certain categories of railroad employees] to submit to breath or
urine tests" if they were working on a train that was involved in certain kinds of
collisions or other incidents).
78 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38, 40-42 (2000) (The Court held
that because such traffic stops (which are Fourth Amendment "seizures") were
essentially conducted to enforce criminal laws against drug possession and trafficking,
they did not qualify as "special needs" searches and were unlawful absent an
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing as to any vehicle that was stopped.).
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requiring drug testing for political candidates79 and for pregnant
women seeking free medical treatment at a public hospital.80
In 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,si a case involving the search
of a fourteen-year-old high school freshman, 82 the Court ruled that
once it had been determined that a "search" occurred (i.e., that a
government agency intruded into a litigant's Fourth Amendment-
protected "reasonable expectation of privacy"), the lawfulness of
these searches should be assessed by a two-part analysis: "[F]irst,
one must consider 'whether the . . . action was justified at its
inception,' second, one must determine whether the search as
actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."' 83
More recently, the Court has applied somewhat differently
worded tests in assessing searches in "special needs" situations,
even in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, 84
7 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a state
requirement that all political candidates submit to drug testing because, among other
things, the requirement was "not well designed to identify candidates who violate
antidrug laws").
80 In Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the Court held that this
procedure, done as part of program in which a pregnant woman who tested positive
would be threatened with prosecution unless she agreed to submit to treatment,
violated the privacy of the women involved because criminal law enforcement was too
central an aspect of the program.
81 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
82 T.L.O. was caught smoking in a bathroom. The assistant principal looked in her
purse and saw a pack of cigarettes. When he removed it, he saw cigarette rolling paper,
which he associated with marijuana use. At this point, he searched the purse
thoroughly and found evidence that the child was selling marijuana to other students
at the school. Id. at 328.
83 Id. at 341. The Court took this test from, and quoted, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), in which the Court held that a police officer may stop to question someone
whom the officer reasonably suspects is committing or is about to commit a crime, and
that if the officer reasonably suspects that person is armed, the officer may "frisk" the
person (i.e., may run his hands along the outer layer of the person's clothing to see if he
is in fact carrying a weapon). Id. at 20. In T.L.O., the Court, applying this two-part
test, upheld the assistant principal's actions, ruling that each step was justified by
what he had discovered by the previous step. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48.
8 "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search
are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may
be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion." Skinner v Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n,
489 U.S. 656, 624 (1989) (quoted approvingly in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314
(1997)).
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and has offered yet another two-part formula for assessing
searches generally.85
In Quon, the Court addressed, but did not decide, whether
the T.L.O. formula is appropriate when a government agency
searches an employee's workspace or his on-the-job
communications solely for internal administrative purposes,
unconnected with larger government policies or responsibilities.
Quon, however, was not the first case in which the Court pondered
that issue; it had done so twenty-three years earlier, in O'Connor
v. Ortega.86 Because an understanding of O'Connor is necessary to
understand Quon, it is to the O'Connor case that this Article now
turns.
II. O'CONNOR V. ORTEGA
A. Facts and Issues
Dr. Magno Ortega had served as Napa State Hospital's Chief
of Professional Education for seventeen years.87 In 1981, Dr.
Dennis O'Connor, the hospital's Executive Director, received
allegations that Dr. Ortega had engaged in various kinds of
wrongdoing.88 Dr. O'Connor ordered an investigation, during
which Dr. Ortega was barred from hospital grounds while hospital
85 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (stating that the reasonableness
of a search is determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests"). In Houghton, the
Court upheld a search of all containers in the passenger compartment of an automobile
where probable cause existed that at least one occupant possessed a controlled
substance. Court quoted and applied the Houghton formula in United States. V.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001), wherein the Court held that a state may
legitimately impose, as a condition of probation, that a police officer may search the
probationer or his home whenever the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is engaged in wrongdoing, and in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848
(2006), where the Court held that a state may legitimately require, as a condition of
parole, that a parolee consent to a search whenever asked to do so by a parole officer or
law enforcement officer even in the absence of reason to suspect the parolee of any
wrongdoing.
8 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
8 Id. at 712. Dr. Ortega's primary responsibility was training young physicians in
psychiatric residency programs. Id.
88 Id. Dr. Ortega was accused of coercing contributions from residents in order to
purchase a computer for his office, of sexually harassing two female hospital
employees, and of taking inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident. Id.
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officials searched Dr. Ortega's office. 89 The underlying reason for
the search was a hotly disputed issue at trial, but in any event,
the search was quite thorough: hospital personnel went through
his desk drawers and filing cabinets and seized a wide range of
objects, including a substantial number of clearly personal
items.90 Dr. Ortega sued the hospital per 42 U.S.C. § 1983,91
alleging that the search of his office was motivated by a desire to
find evidence to support the allegations against him, and therefore
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.92 The hospital asserted that the search was
conducted to secure state property in the office, and was therefore
reasonable.93 The district court, accepting this defense, granted
summary judgment for the hospital. 94 The Ninth Circuit
reversed,95 holding that as a matter of law (1) Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file
drawers,96 and (2) that the search violated that expectation.97 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the only issue for the trial court to
resolve was the amount of damages to which Dr. Ortega was
entitled.98
89 Id. at 712-13.
9n Id. at 714. These included billing documents of a private patient of Dr. Ortega's.
Id.
91 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .
92 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 714.
93 Id. As it turned out, the investigators seized certain items during their searches,
but "did not otherwise separate Dr. Ortega's property from state property because, as
one investigator testified, 'It]rying to sort State from non-State, it was too much to do,
so I gave it up . . . .' Id. at 713-14. No formal inventory was ever made of the contents
of the office; "[i]nstead, all the papers in Dr. Ortega's office were merely placed in
boxes, and put in storage for Dr. Ortega to retrieve." Id. at 714.
94 Ortega v. O'Connor, No. C-82-4045-JPV, 1993 WL 87804 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23,
1993) (unreported case).
95 Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
96 Id. Concerning the centrality of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept
to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see supra Part I.A.1.
97 Ortega, 764 F.2d at 706-07.
98 Id. at 707.
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The hospital appealed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.99 Issues before the Supreme Court included: (1) Did Dr.
Ortega have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk, file
drawers, and office? (2) If so, against what standard should that
expectation, and the hospital's justification for the search and
seizure, be measured? (3) Was the Ninth Circuit correct in ruling
that, as a matter of law, Dr. Ortega's right to privacy existed, and
that the hospital's actions violated those rights?
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that Dr. Ortega
indeed did have a Fourth Amendment-protected right to privacy
in his desk, file drawers, and office, but concluded that the record
below had not been adequately developed to determine whether
the hospital's search of his office was reasonable.100 The Court
therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, and remanded. 01
This brief summary of the result, however, is a significant over-
simplification. The case produced three separate opinions: Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Powell); Justice Scalia's (mostly)
concurring opinion;102 and Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion 03 (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens).
99 O'Connor v. Ortega, 474 U.S. 1018 (1985) (granting certiorari).
100 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 727-29.
101 Id. The case has a convoluted history thereafter. After a trial, the judge directed
a verdict for the defendants; the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling the trial judge had
improperly precluded Dr. Ortega from calling several witnesses. Ortega v. O'Connor, 50
F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1995). On retrial, a jury found for Dr. Ortega and awarded him
$400,000 in damages; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ortega v. O'Connor, 146 F.3d 1149
(9th Cir. 1998). The verdict seems well-justified. During the search, hospital personnel
closely scrutinized obviously personal items; the hospital did not permit Dr. Ortega to
reclaim his personal property for several months; and it even used some highly private
items scrutinized during the search to impeach witnesses who testified on Dr. Ortega's
behalf at the post-remand trial. Id. at 1152.
102 Justice Scalia was in the unusual (for him) position of being the swing justice. Of
the four issues before the Court, he agreed with Justice O'Connor's plurality on two
issues, the Blackmun dissent on one issue, and with neither on yet another issue.
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 729 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
All nine Justices agreed that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his desk and file drawers.104 The Court
divided, however, as to whether such an expectation existed in his
entire office. The plurality Justices, after an extensive discussion
of the need to consider "[t]he operational realities of the
workplace"105 in order to determine whether an employee's Fourth
Amendment rights are implicated by a search of the office as a
whole, declined to decide the issue. 06 The four (otherwise)
dissenting Justices and Justice Scalia, however, concluded that as
a general rule, a government employee does have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her office. As Justice Scalia put it:
"one's personal office is constitutionally protected" 0 7 except in
''unusual situations" in which the office is subject to "unrestricted
public access." 08 Thus, a clear 5-4 majority exists as to the
office. 109
104 Id. at 718 (plurality opinion); id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 732
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J., concurring with the other
five Justices on this issue, although dissenting on pretty much everything else).
10 Id. at 717 (plurality opinion).
106 See id. at 714-18. The plurality declined to decide it, reasoning that the office
question was superfluous because the search of his desk and file cabinet clearly had
intruded upon Dr. Ortega's reasonable privacy expectations; thus, regardless of how
the Court ruled regarding the office, it was necessary for the Court to consider the
appropriate standard against which those searches should be measured. Id. at 718-19.
107 Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 731.
109 Id. at 732. Despite the unusual source of the five votes on this issue (one
concurring Justice and four otherwise dissenting Justices), their conclusion, that Dr.
Ortega had a Fourth Amendment-protected expectation of privacy in his office,
probably can be considered a "holding" of the Court. In Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977), the Court commented: "When a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Id. at 193. (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the Court certainly "fragmented" in O'Connor, the
four dissenting and one concurring justices did agree on the rationale for recognizing
Dr. Ortega's privacy expectations in his office. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
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C. Appropriate Standard to Determine "Reasonableness"
Given the Court's conclusion that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk, file drawers, and
office, it necessarily follows that when hospital officials examined
and boxed up the items they found there, they had conducted a
Fourth Amendment "search" of those areas and a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" of those items.110 The Court next addressed
the question: What standard should be used to measure the
reasonableness of a government employer's search of an
employee's private work space? Should a court apply the same
standard as the one that police must satisfy when they are
seeking evidence of criminal activity, which would generally
require a warrant based on probable cause; or a different standard
and, if so, what should that standard be?"'
1. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion
The plurality concluded that the warrant and probable cause
requirements should not apply to a search prompted by "special
needs," such as a search, like this one, that was based solely on
administrative concerns and not possible criminal violations.112
Justice Scalia agreed."13 Thus, a 5-4 majority rejected imposing
the probable cause and search warrant requirements to "non-
criminal" searches by government officials of a government
employee's private workspace.114 Moreover, the plurality and
11 See supra Part I.A.1.
nII The dissent argued that the Court should not have addressed the question at all.
See infra Part II.C.3.
112 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion).
113 Id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114 Since O'Connor, there has been little discussion in opinions of the Court
concerning an application of the warrant requirement in non-criminal law contexts. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 611 (1989), the Court
held that it was reasonable "to require [specified categories of railroad] employees to
submit to breath or urine tests" if a train on which they were working was involved in
certain types of accidents or incidents. Id. at 611. A six-three majority held that based
on the exigencies involved-if blood and urine samples were not taken promptly, the
railroad employee's body would eliminate evidence of alcohol or drug use-neither
probable cause nor a search warrant was needed. Id. at 634. Only Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that while exigencies excused obtaining
a warrant before drawing the samples, a warrant should be required before those
samples are tested. Id. at 642-43.
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Justice Scalia explicitly rejected those requirements, whether the
search in question was a simple search for a file in the employee's
absence, or a search prompted by suspicions that the employee
had engaged in wrongdoing. The plurality expressed it thus:
An employer may have need for correspondence, or a file or
report available only in an employee's office while the
employee is away from the office. Or, as is alleged to have
been the case here, employers may need to safeguard or
identify state property or records in an office in connection
with a pending investigation into suspected employee
misfeasance. 115
Justice Scalia used the same examples.116 Thus, a 5-4 majority of
the Court decided against applying the warrant and probable
cause requirements to a government employer's "special needs"
search of an employee's office.
No majority emerged, however, as to what the appropriate
standard should be. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion applied
the two-step process that the Court had articulated two years
earlier in New Jersey v. T.L.O: "[F]irst, one must consider
'whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,' second, one
must determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place."'117 Given that this two-part
test, or similar tests,118 have been applied in so many other
contexts,119 it may seem sensible enough to apply it as well to
government employer-employee searches. But consider: in each of
the other cases applying such a formula, the government entity,
whether an agency of the federal, state, city, county, or local
government, was acting in its capacity as the government in the
furtherance of government goals. 120 Even in National Treasury
115 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721-22 (plurality opinion).
116 See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the warrant and probable cause
requirements for "searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate
violations of workplace rules").
11 Id. at 726 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)); see supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
119 See supra Part I.C.2.
120 See supra Part I.C.2.
2012] 1381
1382 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5
Employees Union v. Von Raab,121 which involved a regulation
requiring certain government employees to submit to urine
testing, the underlying purpose was not merely the internal
administration of the agency, but the broader goal of assuring the
honesty and competence of law enforcement officials so they would
effectively carry out their public duties. 122
In O'Connor v. Ortega, however, the hospital was not acting
as a government agency per se; rather, it was acting strictly as an
employer seeking to determine whether one of its employees had
misappropriated hospital property or violated hospital policies.
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia, whose concurrence provided the fifth vote
rejecting the probable cause and warrant standards, rejected the
plurality's two-part formula, protesting that it was so vague as to
be almost meaningless.1 23 He proposed an alternative: if a
government agency searches an employee's workspace while
acting solely as an employer, and not in furtherance of any
121 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
122 In light of the U.S. Customs Service's responsibilities in interdicting and seizing
illegal drugs smuggled into the country, the service implemented a program requiring
service employees to submit to urinalysis tests if they sought transfer or promotion to
positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the incumbent
to carry firearms. The Supreme Court upheld the program, concluding that it came
within the area of "special government needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement," id. at 665-66, i.e., "to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion
to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to
those positions." Id. at 666.
123 Justice Scalia objects with some frequency that rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court are so vague as to give almost unbridled discretion to judges. See, for
example, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), in which the Court, per Justice
Scalia, noted criticism of the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as "circular .
. . subjective and unpredictable." Id. at 34. It was on the same basis that Justice Scalia,
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62-63 (2004), persuaded the Court to abandon
its previous approach to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and replace it
with an entirely different approach (as a result, Confrontation Clause issues are now
resolved simply, clearly, concisely, and without the contaminant of judicial
subjectivity). To paraphrase Artemus Ward, President Lincoln's favorite humorist, the
previous parenthetical "is rote sarcastikul." CHARLES FARRAR BROWNE (ARTEMUS
WARD), ARTEMUS WARD: HIs BOOK, A VISIT TO BRIGHAM YOUNG (1862); see BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 616:11 (Little, Brown & Co. 15th ed. 1980). For an example of
the rather unsettled state of Confrontation Clause law after Crawford, see Michigan v.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
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broader governmental function, then the search is lawful so long
as the search would be considered reasonable if conducted in a
non-governmental workplace. Thus, for example, if the
government agency conducts a search "to retrieve work-related
materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules-searches
of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the
private-employer context," then the search is ipso facto reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 124
Although Justice Scalia did not elaborate further, he appears
to have reasoned that when a government agency is acting strictly
as an employer, and not as a government agency per se, a
government employee should enjoy no greater (and no lesser) right
to privacy than an employee of a non-government entity.
Presumably, therefore, when a government agency conducts a
non-criminal-law oriented search, a court should not look to, or
create, a body of Fourth Amendment law, but should apply tort
and employment law to determine whether an actionable invasion
of privacy has occurred.
3. Dissent
The dissenting Justices accepted the Ninth Circuit's factual
conclusion that hospital personnel conducted the search looking
for evidence of Dr. Ortega's alleged misconduct, and therefore the
search was investigative in nature. Based on this conclusion, the
dissent insisted that an investigative search of this kind, though it
did not involve suspicion of criminal conduct, could be lawful only
if authorized by a search warrant based on probable cause, albeit
with some adjustment of probable cause reflecting the noncriminal
nature of the investigation and suspected wrongdoing. 25 Given
that the Court remanded the case for further fact-finding, Justice
Blackmun also criticized the plurality for "announc[ing] a
standard concerning the reasonableness of a public employer's
search of the workplace,"126 adding: "This does not seem to me to
be the way to undertake Fourth Amendment analysis, especially
124 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 707, 733 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
125 Id. at 732, 741-47 (Blackmun, J., joined Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, J.J.,
dissenting).
126 Id. at 733.
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in an area[-searches of a government employee's work
space-]with which the Court is relatively unfamiliar."127 He also
complained that the plurality's standard was so one-sided that it
"makes reasonable almost any workplace search by a public
employer." 128
III. CITY OF ONTARIO V. QUON
It was not until the Quon decision, twenty-three years after
O'Connor, that the Court again addressed the issue of government
employee privacy.129 During the interval, lower courts generally
considered the O'Connor plurality approach to be the applicable
law in invasion of privacy suits brought by government employees
against their employer.130 Indeed, in the lower court litigation in
Quon and in their briefs and arguments before the Supreme
Court, both sides in the Quon case assumed, federal statutory
issues aside, that the O'Connor plurality was the law.131
A. Facts
The facts and lower-court proceedings in Quon are fairly
complicated. For purposes of this Article, however, the essential
facts are these:
1. Jeff Quon was a sergeant in the Ontario Police Department
assigned to the SWAT team,132 presumably a fairly important
127 Id.
128 Id. at 734. Despite these concerns, Dr. Ortega ultimately prevailed in his suit.
See supra note 101.
129 The Court did address the Fourth Amendment in the Government-as-employer
context in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), but
as noted supra note 121-22, that case fell into a "special needs" category of a very
different nature than a simple employer-employee relationship.
130 See, e.g., Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Warrantless Search by Government
Employer of Employee's Workplace Locker, Desk, or the Like as Violation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy Rights-Federal Cases, 91 A.L.R. FED. 226 (1989 & Supp.).
131 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010).
132 See BRUCE L. BERG, POLICING IN MODERN SOCIETY 133 (1999) ("Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) team[s] . . . [are] squads of specially trained officers [ ] regarded
both by citizens and police personnel as elite teams of highly trained and skilled law
enforcement agents. . . . Typically, SWAT teams are called to the scenes of ongoing,
dangerous situations after more conventional strategies have failed, or when serious
and imminent threats to peoples' lives exist . . . . In some jurisdictions, these units
simply are called tactical units. . . . Members of these tactical teams have received
firearms and strategic planning training, as well as training in climbing and
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command within the OPD.'as Each SWAT officer was issued an
alphanumeric pager, to enable the officers to communicate with
each other if an emergency arose which required their
deployment.134 The city contracted with Arch Wireless Operating
Company to provide the wireless services for the pagers. 35 That
contract included a set limit of characters per month for each
pager.136
2. The officers were told officially that they had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in any messages they sent or received on
the pagers, and that the OPD and the city had the right to
monitor or review all messages.13 7 This admonition was consistent
with the city's previously announced policy, applicable to all city
personnel, that the city "reserves the right to monitor and log all
network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or
without notice," and that "[u]sers should have no expectation of
privacy or confidentiality when using these resources."138
However, OPD Lt. Duke, in charge of the pager system, informally
told Sgt. Quon and the others that no one would monitor their
messages if they paid for any excess messages (overages) beyond
the monthly limit set in the contract between the OPD and Arch
Wireless. 139
3. Sgt. Quon and a few other officers frequently exceeded the
limit and paid for the overages.1 40 Eventually the OPD Police
Chief directed Lt. Duke to obtain two months of text messages
sent and received by two officers, including Sgt. Quon.141 Arch
Wireless dutifully provided the transcripts as requested. The
parties disagreed as to the reason for the review. Plaintiffs
rappelling, handling highjackings and other hostage situations, and riot control
tactics.").
133 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
134 Id. at 2625.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. This was communicated to Sgt. Quon and the others verbally and in writing.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 2615.
140 Id. at 2625-26.
141 Id. The other officer selected was not a party to the law suit, Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2006), and the reported
decisions in the case do not indicate anything about his messages.
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claimed it was to investigate suspicions that Quon was spending
too much on-duty time texting on personal matters.142 Defendants
insisted the decision was based on both Lt. Duke's complaints that
some of the officers exceeded the limits so regularly that he had
essentially become a collection agent for Arch Wireless and on
departmental concern that perhaps the monthly character limit
included in the contract was too low to cover the officers' on-duty
needs.143
4. Reviewing Sgt. Quon's messages, Lt. Duke discovered that
the overwhelming majority of his messages were not work-
related. 144 In fact, Quon was using the pager to exchange sexually
explicit messages with his wife Jerilyn, who was also an OPD
police officer,145 and to exchange similar messages with another
woman, April Florio, a dispatcher for the OPD with whom he was
having an extramarital affair.146 The matter was referred to the
Internal Affairs Bureau of the OPD.147 An investigator
determined that in one month, Quon had sent or received 456
messages during work hours (an average of twenty-eight a day), of
which only 10% (an average of three a day) were work-related.148
142 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
143 Id.; Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.
144 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.
145 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. As the district court described it:
Many of the text messages sent and/or received by Quon's pager while he was
on-duty were, to say the least, sexually explicit in nature. Some of these
messages were directed to or from his wife, Jerilyn Quon, while others were
directed to or from his mistress, Florio. Other messages, while not sexually
explicit were nonetheless private, were sent to and received from his
co-worker.
Id. at 1126. This passage gives the distinct impression that Quon exchanged sexually
explicit messages with his wife as well as Ms. Florio. However, the Supreme Court's
decision in the case refers to "the other respondents, each of whom exchanged text
messages with Quon during August and September 2002: Jerilyn Quon, Jeff Quon's
then-wife, from whom he was separated . . . ." Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626. This suggests,
albeit not conclusively, that Quon's texts to and from his wife were not sexually
explicit.
146 Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. It emerged during a parallel but separate
investigation that another OPD dispatcher was tipping off the Hell's Angels motorcycle
gang whenever an OPD officer conducted surveillance of a member of the gang, and
Ms. Florio was aware of this but did not report it. Id. at 1122. Ms. Florio was
subsequently fired. Id.
147 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626.
141 Id.
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5. Sgt. Quon was disciplined for violating OPD rules that
forbade pursuing personal matters while on duty. 149
6. Quon, his wife, and Ms. Florio sued the city, several OPD
officials, and Arch Wirelesso50 per 42 U.S.C. § 1983,151 alleging
violations of their Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2701, the "Stored Communications Act"
(SCA).152 Sgt. Quon also apparently exchanged numerous non-
work-related messages with Sergeant Steve Trujillo, another
member of the SWAT team, 153 and Sgt. Trujillo joined as a
plaintiff in the suit. The two sergeants and the two women are
sometimes referred to collectively as the plaintiffs. 1 54
7. The trial judge, attempting to apply the O'Connor v.
Ortega plurality approach to plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim,
ruled that the case depended on why the OPD initially decided to
review Quon's transcripts-if it was to review the adequacy of the
existing contract with Arch Wireless, then the judgment would be
for the defendants; if it was to investigate possible wrongdoing by
Quon, then judgment would be entered for the plaintiffs.15 5 The
jury concluded that the Chief of Police ordered the review of
officers' text messages to determine whether the character limit
on the city's contract with Arch Wireless was sufficient to meet
the city's needs. Therefore, the District Court entered judgment
for the city and the OPD. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth
Circuit.
149 Id.
150 This may have made for some fairly interesting plaintiffs' conferences.
151 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626. For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note 91.
152 For a summary of the SCA, see supra Part I.B.2.
153 None of the court opinions describe the subject of the messages between the two
sergeants, which presumably were not as titillating as Quon's texts to and from his
wife and Ms. Florio.
154 Because they were victorious before the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs technically
were the respondents before the Supreme Court.
155 The trial judge reasoned that Lt. Duke's informal assurance to the SWAT team
members, see supra Part III.A., created a reasonable expectation of privacy and
concluded that if the review of Quon's messages was investigative, rather than
administrative, it violated that expectation. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445




An explanation of the technology in question is now in
order.156 Most electronic communications involve one or more
Internet service providers (ISPs). Well-known ISPs include G-
mail, AOL, Yahoo!, etc. In addition, many companies, private
entities like universities, and government agencies are also ISPs,
because they provide their own Internet access to employees.
When I send an e-mail or text message to a friend, for example, it
goes from my computer (or pager or smart phone) to my ISP,
whose computer system forwards it to my friend's ISP, which
forwards it to my friend's computer or other receiving device. Each
ISP must temporarily store the communication within its
computer system until its part of the transfer is complete. For
example, my friend's ISP retains the message at least until my
friend opens it. Moreover, most ISPs retain a back-up copy, more
or less indefinitely, even after the recipient deletes it from his or
her inbox (Developments in communications technology may soon
render this process obsolete, but this is how the Arch Wireless
system worked in 2002.).157 Thus, although Sgt. Quon and those
with whom he texted had probably deleted their messages from
the devices they were using, Arch Wireless retained copies, and
therefore could, and did, provide transcripts of Quon's messages
when the OPD asked for them.
C. The Ninth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered three issues. First,
the court considered whether Arch Wireless violated the Stored
156 For a detailed description of how the pager system, including the sending and
receiving of text messages, worked, see Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d
892, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,
2633 (2010).
157 Sgt. Quon was utilizing a two way alphanumeric pager which enabled him to
send and receive text messages to other pagers, e-mail, etc. This same technology is
used in cellular phones today. For a brief history of text messaging, see Collette
Snowden, Casting a Powerful Spell: The Evolution of SMS, in THE CELL PHONE
READER: ESSAYS IN SOcIAL TRANSFORMATION 107-24 (Anandam Kavoori & Noah
Arceneaux eds., 2006).
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Communications Act when it provided the OPD with printouts of
the text messages. The Ninth Circuit held that it did.15 8
Second, the Court considered whether Quon and the other
plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
his non-work related text messages. The Ninth Circuit,
attempting to apply the O'Connor v. Ortega plurality approach,
held that he did. 159 Third, having decided that the plaintiffs had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court considered whether it
was nevertheless reasonable for Lt. Duke to review two months'
worth of Quon's text messages. The Ninth Circuit, attempting to
apply the O'Connor plurality approach, reversed the district court,
and held that, as a matter of law, the OPD review was
unreasonably intrusive and therefore violated plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights.160
D. The Supreme Court Decision: Overview
The City of Ontario and Arch Wireless appealed three issues
to the Supreme Court: (1) the Ninth Circuit's application of the
SCA; (2) the circuit court's conclusion that the plaintiffs had a
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in Quon's
text messages; and (3) the Ninth Circuit's ruling that OPD's
review of those messages constituted an unlawful search of them.
158 Quon, 529 F.3d at 903. I believe the Ninth Circuit decided the statutory issue
incorrectly. I will not go into detail here, except to note that in holding that Arch
Wireless violated the SCA, the Ninth Circuit relied on its earlier decision, Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). In Theofel, defendant Farey-Jones made an
unconscionably broad discovery demand upon Theofel's ISP and then improperly
exploited the ISP's naive attempt to comply with it. Theofel sued for damages. Anyone
familiar with the facts would want to hit Farey-Jones and his attorney, and hit them
hard. The difficulty is that, though their behavior was indefensible, they had not
violated either of the federal statutes on which Theofel based his case: the Stored
Communications Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Faced with this
dilemma, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to completely "rewrite" those two statutes to its
own satisfaction so Theofel could sue Farey-Jones (For my analysis of Theofel, see
FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, § 7:11. If I had the time, I would write an article
about that case, whose title would be: "I do not like thee, Theofel. The reason why is
plain to tell: you've warped these statutes all to hell! I do not like thee, Theofel.").
us Quon, 529 F.3d at 904.
160 Id. at 908-09. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Quon v.
Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769 (2009). Judge Ikuta, joined by six other
Circuit Judges, dissented. Id. at 774-79. Judge Wardlaw, who voted to deny re-hearing,
wrote an opinion responding to Judge Ikuta's dissent. Id. at 769-74.
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The Supreme Court denied Arch Wireless's cert application on the
statutory issue,161 but granted certiorari on both Fourth
Amendment issues. 62
As it turned out, however, although the Court granted
certiorari on the expectation of privacy issue, ultimately, to the
disappointment of some and to the relief of others, it did not
resolve whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those text messages. 163 Instead, the Court decided only one issue:
the reasonableness of the OPD's review of Sgt. Quon's text
messages. Rejecting both the District Court's and the Ninth
Circuit's attempts to apply the O'Connor plurality approach, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the review of Quon's text
messages was reasonable under the circumstances.164
But in Quon, as in O'Connor, unanimity in the result did not
lend clarity to the law. A majority of the Court in Quon, per
Justice Kennedy, explicitly acknowledged that neither the
O'Connor plurality nor Justice Scalia's O'Connor concurrence was
firmly established as the law defining how the Fourth Amendment
applied to government workplace searches.' 65 Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion then proceeded to discuss how the O'Connor
plurality approach might apply to the reasonableness of the
review of Quon's text messages.166 Justice Scalia wrote a
somewhat scornful concurring opinion in which he derided the
majority's explanation of why it did not decide the expectation of
privacy issue,'67 complained that the majority placed too much
emphasis on the O'Connor plurality approach in addressing the
reasonableness of the OPD's review of the text messages,16 8 and
insisted that his approach to the government workplace privacy
issue was and still is the best approach.169 Justice Stevens, also
concurring in the result, argued that neither the O'Connor
161 USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009).
162 Id.
163 The Court's discussion of this issue, and its explanation why it did not decide it,
is addressed infra Part IV.A.1.
164 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010).
165 Id. at 2628.
166 This discussion occurs in Part III.B of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. Id. at
2630-32; see also infra Part III.E.2.
167 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634-35 (Scalia, J., concurring); see infra Part III.F.
168 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635.
169 Id.
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plurality nor the Scalia O'Connor concurrence approaches was a
good idea, and urged that the Court should eschew any sweeping
generalities and decide each case on its facts. 170
E. The Majority Opinion
At the outset, Justice Kennedy, for the Court, reviewed the
dispute between the O'Connor plurality and Justice Scalia's
O'Connor concurrence as to the appropriate standard applicable in
government-as-employer search cases.171 The majority then made
three assumptions (without deciding those issues) for the sake of
its opinion.
1. Three Assumptions
The Court first assumed that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his non-work-related text messages.172
Second, the Court assumed that the OPD's review of the message
transcripts constituted a Fourth Amendment search. This
assumption follows logically from the first because a Fourth
170 Id. at 2633-34 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
737-41 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Justices Stevens and Scalia are the only two
Justices who had been on the Court when O'Connor was decided. They had disagreed
in that case and resumed the dispute twenty-three years later in Quon. Justice Scalia,
in a footnote in his concurrence, accused Justice Stevens of implying that the approach
advocated by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in O'Connor was still a viable option, and
then rejected that implication:
There is room for reasonable debate as to which of the two approaches
advocated by Justices whose votes supported the judgment in O'Connor-the
plurality's and mine-is controlling under Marks v. United States. But unless
O'Connor is overruled, it is assuredly false that a test that would have
produced the opposite result in that case is still in the running.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens footnoted back,
insisting that the Blackmun approach was not precluded by the Court's decision in
O'Connor. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Given that the Quon majority paid deference to
Justice Scalia's O'Connor concurrence while making no reference to Justice Blackmun's
O'Connor dissent, Justice Scalia wins the footnote battle by a technical knockout, and
this Article will not refer further to Justice Stevens's opinion in Quon.
171 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
172 Id. at 2630. Initially, Quon presumably did not have any such expectation; he
was officially told that the OPD reserved the right to monitor messages sent and
received. Thus, he would be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy only if Lt.
Duke created such an expectation when he informally promised not to read Quon's
messages so long as Quon paid for any excess over the contracted amount. See supra
notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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Amendment search occurs when, and only if, a government entity
has intruded into a reasonable expectation of privacy. 173 Third,
the court assumed that the same principles applicable to a
government employer's search of an employee's physical office
apply as well in the electronic sphere.174
2. The OPD Review of the Transcripts was Reasonable;
Applying the O'Connor Plurality Approach
The majority concluded that, even making all these
assumptions, the OPD's decision to review Quon's text messages,
and the scope and degree of intrusion involved in that review,
were reasonable as a matter of law. In explaining this decision,
Justice Kennedy, for the Court, stated that it need not decide
whether to apply the O'Connor plurality approach to privacy in
the government workplace, or the approach advocated in Justice
Scalia's O'Connor concurrence, because the OPD's search in Quon
was reasonable under either.175
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion proceeded
to apply the O'Connor plurality approach-first, one must
consider whether the action was "justified at its inception," and
second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted was "reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances" which
justified the interference in the first place.176 The Court held that
OPD's review of the messages (assuming that this was a "search"
at all) was "justified at its inception" because it had a legitimate
departmental purpose-to determine whether the monthly
character limit was adequate.177
The Court also concluded that the manner and intrusiveness
of the search were reasonable. First, an examination of the
transcripts of Sgt. Quon's transcripts constituted "an efficient and
173 See supra Part I.A.1.
174 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629-30; see infra Part IVAL.
175 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628-29.
176 Id. at 2630 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court's application of O'Connor to the OPD review of
Quon's messages occurs in Part III.B of the Court's opinion.
177 Id. at 2619, 2631 (citations omitted) (citing O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726).
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expedient way to determine whether Quon's overages were the
result of work-related messaging or personal use."178
Second, the Court considered the nature and extent of Quon's
expectation of privacy in his text messages (assuming he had one
at all). The Ninth Circuit apparently concluded that Lt. Duke's
promise that no one would audit Quon's messages so long as he
paid for the overage gave Quon a nigh-absolute expectation of
privacy.179 Indeed, the only potential diminishment of that right
the circuit court mentioned was the possibility that someone
might seek Quon's private messages under the California Public
Records Act (CPRA), CAL. GOv'T CODE § 6253,180 a possibility the
Ninth Circuit dismissed as so slight as to not be worth
considering. 181
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. Assuming Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal messages,
the Court insisted, it is necessary to assess the degree to which
Quon has a reasonable expectation of privacy in those
messages,182 and the likelihood (from the OPD's viewpoint) that
reviewing the transcripts "would intrude on highly private details
of Quon's life." 183 The Court concluded that Quon could reasonably
expect only limited privacy in his text messages, because as a law
enforcement officer, he "would or should have known that his [use
178 Id. at 2631.
179 Quon v Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also Quon v Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 2009) (Wardlaw,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
180 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6253 (West 2009), directs that "public records are open to
inspection at all times ... and every person has a right to inspect any public record."
181 "The CPRA does not diminish an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy
[because tihere is no evidence . . . suggesting that CPRA requests to the department
are so widespread or frequent" as to deprive OPD personnel of a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Quon, 529 F.3d at 907 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But consider: suppose there had been no OPD review of Quon's messages, but
Mrs. Quon began to suspect that her husband was cheating on her. The thought
occurred to her: "Jeff enjoys sexually explicit texting with me. If he has a girlfriend, he
probably does the same with her." After consulting with an attorney, she filed a
disclosure request per the CPRA. Whither Sgt. Quon's reasonable expectation of
privacy then?
182 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631.
18 Id. at 2631.
1394 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5
of the pager was] likely to come under legal scrutiny" for a variety
of legitimate reasons.184
3. Availability of "Less Intrusive Means"
The Supreme Court was particularly critical of one aspect of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in the case. The circuit court, in ruling
for the plaintiffs, held that reading Quon's messages was
unreasonable because the OPD could have employed several less
intrusive means to evaluate the adequacy of the contract with
Arch Wireless.s85 The "least intrusive means" concept, and the
Supreme Court's treatment of it, merit a somewhat detailed look.
The phrase "least intrusive means" was first used by the
Supreme Court in a Fourth Amendment context in Florida u.
Royer.186 A plurality of the Court stated that an investigative
detention in the absence of probable cause "must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop," and that "the investigative methods employed should be
the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."187 Since Royer,
184 Id. The Court commented:
As a law enforcement officer, [Quon] would or should have known that his
actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail
an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a
reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles
might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was
being appropriately used. Given that the City issued the pagers to Quon and
other SWAT Team members in order to help them more quickly respond to
crises-and given that Quon had received no assurances of privacy-Quon
could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager
messages to assess the SWAT Team's performance in particular emergency
situations.
Id. The Court did not mention the CPRA.
185 The Ninth Circuit suggested two such means. First, the OPD could have ordered
Quon not to use the pager for personal messages in September; the OPD would thereby
obtain an accurate count of the number of characters he used on work-related messages
during that month. Quon, 529 F.3d at 909. Second, it could have asked Quon to count
the characters himself, redact out the personal messages, and permit OPD to review
the redacted transcript. Id.
186 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
187 Id. at 500 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Police officers
assigned to airport duty, suspecting that Royer was a drug courier, stopped him and
asked him to accompany them to a small police room, retained his ticket and driver's
license, and did not inform him that he was free to depart. Id. Ultimately the officers
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the "least intrusive" principle has been quoted approvingly in an
occasional concurring or dissenting opinion.188 In several decisions
prior to Quon, however, a clear majority of the Court explicitly
rejected the idea that Fourth Amendment searches and seizures
were subject to a general "least intrusive means" requirement-in
a substantial number of these cases, reversing decisions by the
Ninth Circuit in the process. 89 In Quon, the Court did so again:
searched Royer's luggage and found a significant quantity of marijuana. Id. The Court
held that the initial stop was reasonable. Id. at 501. But the court concluded that the
rest of the officers' actions were unreasonable, given that nothing in the record
suggested that safety or other legitimate concerns made it inappropriate to question
Royer in the open. Id. at 501-02 (The Court also upheld a lower court finding that
Royer had not consented to the secluded detention. Id. at 502-03.). Justice Brennan,
whose concurring opinion provided the fifth and decisive vote to suppress the evidence,
protested that the plurality opinion constituted a dangerous extension of the stop-and-
frisk doctrine promulgated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), but took some comfort
from the plurality's apparent imposition of the least intrusive means limitation on
Terry stops. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 511 n.* (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
188 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 693-94 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
1ss In Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995), the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld a school system's random urine testing of
student athletes without particularized suspicion. Id. The Court commented: "We have
repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. Similarly in another special needs
context, see United States u. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976), in which the
Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit, rejected the "least intrusive means" approach in
upholding the constitutionality of permanent immigration checkpoints on major roads
near the Mexican border. Id. Likewise, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 542-43 (1985), in which the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's suppression of
evidence obtained as a result of a sixteen-hour border detention of a woman suspected
(correctly) of attempting to smuggle drugs into the U.S. in her alimentary canal. Id. In
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989), the Court held that, contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's view, DEA agents had a reasonable suspicion that Sokolow was a drug
courier, and that their temporary detention of him at Honolulu Airport to question him
was lawful. Id. Stressing that Royer was a plurality decision, the Court limited the
"least intrusive" principle to
the length of the investigative stop, not at whether the police had a less
intrusive means to verify their suspicions before stopping Royer. The
reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the
availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. Such a rule would
unduly hamper the police's ability to make swift, on-the-spot decisions-here,
respondent was about to get into a taxicab-and it would require courts to
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing."
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). The Court has rejected arguments based on
the "least intrusive" principle in cases from other circuits as well. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ.
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This Court has repeatedly refused to declare that only the
least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. That rationale could raise insuperable
barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure
powers, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of
government conduct can almost always imagine some
alternative means by which the objectives of the government
might have been accomplished. The analytic errors of the
Court of appeals in this case illustrate the necessity of this
principle. Even assuming there were ways that OPD could
have performed the search that would have been less
intrusive, it does not follow that the search as conducted was
unreasonable. 190
The Court's basic approach to the issue makes good sense
and good law. Government officials should not be held to a rigid
requirement that, in the absence of probable cause, they must
always utilize the procedure that will intrude least into someone's
privacy. A "least intrusive" test is equally inappropriate whether
the officials are acting in a criminal law enforcement capacity, or
in furtherance of "special needs" relating to various public policy
concerns, or merely as employers. But the Ninth Circuit did not
assert that the OPD was required to use the least intrusive means
to resolve its concerns about Quon's messages and the contract
with Arch. Rather, it attempted to apply the second prong of the
O'Connor test: determining whether the measures adopted were
"reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of . .. the nature of the [justification
for the intrusion]." 191 The ultimate mandate of the Fourth
Amendment is that a search or seizure, to be constitutional, must
be "reasonable."1 92 The availability of other means, which would
achieve the government's legitimate goals while intruding less
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (upholding a school drug testing regime); United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (upholding the twenty-minute detention
of a motorist until police could follow up on their suspicions).
190 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
191 Quon v Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)).
192 Recall that the Fourth Amendment protects "[tihe right of the people to be
secure .. . against unreasonable searches and seizures ..... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text for the complete text of the amendment.
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into someone's privacy, surely is relevant-not an above-all-else
factor, but relevant-in assessing the reasonableness of what the
government in fact did. The Ninth Circuit cannot be faulted for
considering the availability of less intrusive means; its error,
rather, was in giving too much weight to them, rather than
assessing the overall reasonableness of what the OPD did in light
of all the circumstances.
Indeed, the Court in Quon implicitly endorsed the principle
that, in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular search, a
court should consider where that search falls on a spectrum of
least intrusive to most intrusive. The Court noted that the police
department in fact had conducted its review of Quon's text
messages in a way that minimized somewhat the intrusion into
his privacy. Although Quon had gone over the character limit
during several months, Lt. Duke asked Arch Wireless for only two
months' transcripts of Sgt. Quon's text messages. 193 The manner
in which the OPD handled the case after Lt. Duke discovered
Quon's misfeasance also demonstrates that the OPD took
reasonable measures to minimize the intrusion into the privacy of
all the plaintiffs. The Internal Affairs investigator assigned to the
case read only Quon's on-duty messages, not those Quon sent or
received while off-duty.194 Another point is worth making,
although the Court did not mention it: apparently the sexually
explicit nature of Quon's text messages with his wife and
girlfriend was not disclosed generally within the department.
There is no suggestion, in any of the published opinions in the
case, that the content of these text messages became general
knowledge until, inevitably, they became public as a result of the
plaintiffs' law suit.195
193 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 ("While it may have been reasonable as well for OPD to
review transcripts of all the months in which Quon exceeded his allowance, it was
certainly reasonable for OPD to review messages for just two months in order to obtain
a large enough sample to decide whether the character limits were efficacious.").
194 Id. at 2631. "[Ulsing Quon's time sheets, [the Internal Affairs office] took the
transcripts and redacted with a black marker those portions that were transmitted
while Quon was off-duty." Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1127 (C.D. Cal 2006). Later Quon's messages with Ms. Florio were examined to see if
Quon was in any way involved in the misconduct at the OPD's dispatch center, see Part
III-A-4, but no such evidence was found. Id.
196 Contrast the behavior of the officers in Casella v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 435
(W.D. Va, 2009). Police seized a cell phone from Ms. Casella's boyfriend, discovered
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The Court also stressed that the reasonableness of the OPD's
review of Sgt. Quon's messages should also be assessed against
what department personnel reasonably expected to find. The Court
correctly observed that when the OPD undertook to review his
messages, his superior officers had no reason to expect that the
transcripts would reveal "highly private details" of his life, his
wife's, and Ms. Florio's.196 Although they did reveal private
details, that was Quon's fault, not the OPD's.
In short, OPD supervisors simply wanted a quick and
efficient way to determine whether the characters-per-month
package with Arch was adequate. Given all of these
circumstances, and the limited privacy expectation (if any) that
Quon had in his text messages in the first place,19 7 what the
department did was quite reasonable, despite the availability of
less intrusive (and less efficient) means.198
that the phone contained sexually explicit photographs of Ms. Casella and her
boyfriend, and, allegedly, shared the photographs with dozens of others in and outside
the police department. Id. at 437. The federal district court dismissed Ms. Casella's
§ 1983 claim on the ground that even if the seizure of the phone from her boyfriend and
subsequent search of the phone violated her boyfriend's rights, there was no violation
of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 439; see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
The court pointedly observed that she could still pursue state claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Casella, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
196 "From OPD's perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy
expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the risk that the
review would intrude on highly private details of Quon's life." Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631.
The Court also commented that OPD's audit of Quon's messages on the OPD-supplied
pager "was not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or pager,
or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have been." Id. This latter observation is of
course true, but it is also essentially irrelevant. Because these techniques would not
have revealed whether the OPD's contract with Arch was adequate, their use would not
have been "justified at [their] inception . O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726
(1987).
197 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
198 It was reasonable for OPD officials to reject the two "less intrusive" methods
suggested by the Ninth Circuit, assuming those methods had occurred to them. See
supra note 185. Ordering Quon not to use the pager for personal messages for a month
would have delayed resolution of the OPD's concerns; providing Quon with a transcript
of his own messages and relying on him to edit out the personal ones also might have
occasioned delays.
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4. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) and the Fourth
Amendment
Although the Court did not grant certiorari on the statutory
issue, it nevertheless discussed the impact of the statute on the
constitutional question, and concluded that a federal statute
designed to protect privacy plays little or no role in deciding
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.
Arch Wireless provided Quon's transcripts when asked for
them by the OPD.199 The Ninth Circuit held that Arch violated the
SCA by doing so. 200 Although the Supreme Court declined to grant
certiorari on that issue,201 the Ninth Circuit's decision on the SCA
provided Quon and the other plaintiffs with a plausible argument:
(1) ECPA was enacted to protect the privacy of electronic
communications. 2 02 (2) The SCA, a major component of ECPA,
was explicitly enacted to protect the privacy of stored electronic
communications, including text messages. 203 (3) The law of the
case, based on the Ninth Circuit's decision, is that the OPD
obtained copies of Quon's text messages as a result of a violation
of the federal statute designed to protect the privacy of such
messages. 204 (4) Ergo, in accessing the copies, the OPD unlawfully
intruded upon Quon's reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court gave little credence or attention to this argument:
[E]ven if the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude that
the SCA forbade Arch Wireless from turning over the
transcripts, it does not follow that petitioners' actions were
unreasonable. Respondents point to no authority for the
proposition that the existence of statutory protection
199 Quon. 130 S. Ct. at 2626. Arch presumably acted on the assumption that since
the pagers were owned by the OPD and that OPD was paying Arch for their use, the
OPD had a legal right to the transcripts. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529
F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2008).
200 See supra Part III.C.
201 See supra Part III.D.
202 See supra Part I.B.2.
203 See supra Part I.B.2.
204 See supra Part III.C.
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renders a search per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. And the precedents counsel otherwise.205
The Court's almost casual dismissal of the SCA as virtually
irrelevant in assessing Fourth Amendment-recognized privacy
expectations is disturbing for several reasons. First, the cases the
Court cited do not truly support the principle for which they are
cited. Second, in Quon itself, the Court strongly indicated that
state statutes may be relevant in determining when expectations
of privacy are reasonable. Third, the Court ignored prior
precedents relying on federal statutes or regulations in applying
the Fourth Amendment.
The precedents the Court cited in this passage do not bear
the weight the Court places on them. Each precedent involved the
impact of state law on the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 206 In
each, the Court emphasized the need to have a uniform standard
nation-wide as to what the Fourth Amendment protected and
what it did not.20 7 The SCA, however, does not involve state law.
It was enacted by the United States Congress and therefore has
nation-wide application.
The Court's opinion in Quon acknowledged that even state
statutes may be relevant in determining when an expectation of
privacy is reasonable. In explaining why it decided not to decide
whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages, the Court, discussing society's evolving attitudes about
workplace privacy and electronic communications media, cited two
205 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (citing Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008)); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)).
206 Greenwood held that a home owner gave up his Fourth Amendment-protected
reasonable expectation of privacy in his household garbage when he placed the garbage
at the curb for collection, even though California's Supreme Court, applying state law,
had previously held that a home owner retained that expectation. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
at 43. Moore held that a search of a motorist incident to his arrest for a traffic violation
was reasonable despite a state statute that precluded custodial arrests for mere traffic
violations. Moore, 553 U.S. at 178.
207 In Greenwood, the Court, by a 7-2 vote, rejected Greenwood's implicit
"suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of each State are to determine the
reach of the Fourth Amendment." Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 44. In Moore, a unanimous
Court, per Justice Scalia, held that the Fourth Amendment was not written to
incorporate individual state's arrest statutes. Moore, 553 U.S. at 178.
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state statutes that require employers to notify employees when
monitoring their electronic communications. 2 08
The Court's casual rejection of the SCA as irrelevant to the
expectation of privacy issue is inconsistent with its prior
considerations of federal legislation when applying the Fourth
Amendment. In United States v. Watson,209 the Court, in holding
that the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless arrests for
felonies even where the agents had ample time to obtain a
warrant, cited several federal statutes that authorize such
arrests. 210 In Florida v. Riley,211 a plurality of the Court, holding
that no "search" occurred when a police helicopter flew over the
defendant's barn at a height of 400 feet to check out a tip
concerning marijuana cultivation, relied in part on the fact that
although the flight was at a lower altitude than Federal Aviation
Commission regulations permitted to fixed-wing aircraft, the
flight had not violated that regulation because it did not apply to
helicopters. 212 In Riley, therefore, the plurality considered a
208 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (citing Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law
Ass'n As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619 (2010) (08-1332), 2010 WL 1186480, at *22). The Brief in turn cited CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2003) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2005). See infra
note 271 and accompanying text where these provisions are summarized.
209 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
210 Id. at 415-16. "Because there is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to
an Act of Congress, especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable,' . . . the Court
should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was
unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional." Id. at 416 (quoting
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948)) (some internal quotation marks
omitted). In so holding, the Court reversed a contrary ruling by the Ninth Circuit.
211 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Police arranged for a helicopter to fly over
Riley's greenhouse. Id. Through its partially open roof, the officer observed marijuana
plants. Based on this information he obtained a search warrant pursuant to which
marijuana was seized. Id. at 448-49.
212 The plurality observed: "We would have a different case if flying at that altitude
had been contrary to law or regulation. . . . [I]t is of obvious importance that the
helicopter in this case was not violating the law ..... Id. at 451. The plurality added
that it was not saying "that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft
will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is
within the navigable airspace specified by law." Id. It is worth noting, however, that
five Justices (a majority of the Court)-Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence was the
deciding vote, and four dissenting Justices-insisted that the reasonableness of Riley's
expectation of privacy depended, not on whether the helicopter flight complied with
FAA regulations, but on whether helicopter flights at that altitude occurred frequently
enough that Riley could reasonably be said to have knowingly exposed the contents of
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federal regulation not directly related to privacy would be relevant
in determining whether a privacy expectation was protected by
the Fourth Amendment. If a federal aviation regulation and state
statutes are relevant in weighing someone's privacy expectations
under the Fourth Amendment, certainly an act of Congress
enacted to protect privacy also merits consideration. Moreover,
Congress, which is directly elected by and answerable to "society"
(i.e., the electorate), presumably reflects, far better than the
Supreme Court, what expectations of privacy "society" accepts as
reasonable,213 particularly in an area as challenging and fluid as
new electronic communications media.
I do not mean to suggest that Congress should always have
the last word on the question. Legislation diminishing an
expectation of privacy is properly subjected to a Fourth
Amendment challenge. But in enacting the SCA, Congress
explicitly created and protected an expectation of privacy in
communications that are sent and stored by a particular use of
technology. Surely the SCA merits greater consideration than the
back-of-the-hand the Court gave it in Quon.
The Court also rejected petitioners' SCA-based argument on
a second, more valid ground. Even if Arch Wireless violated the
SCA in turning over the transcripts, 214 this did not involve any
wrongdoing by members of the OPD, who reasonably (albeit
his barn to the public. Id. at 455 (O'Conner, J., concurring). See the dissents of Justice
Brennan, who wrote for Justices Marshall and Stevens, and Justice Blackmun. Id. at
456, 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined
the plurality opinion because, unlike the four dissenters, she concluded that Riley, not
the state, had the burden of proof on the likelihood of such over flights, and had failed
to present any (nor had the state). It is worth noting that, under the approach urged by
Justice O'Connor and the four dissenters, the result might well depend on where the
events occurred. In some parts of the country, at least, low-flying helicopters are a
frequent, almost an every-day, occurrence. See Adam Nagourney, Helicopters Jam the
Skies over Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011, at A-1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/us/26choppers.html.
213 Criticizing the plurality opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega, Professor Jeffrey Rosen
commented: "It's not surprising that Supreme Court justices, who are secluded in a
marble palace and have spent most of their careers in the cosseted solitude of lower
courts and universities, aren't terribly good at predicting how much privacy ordinary
Americans expect in the workplace." JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 63 (2000).
214 I consider this a dubious proposition. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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perhaps incorrectly) assumed that the department was entitled to
them:
Furthermore, respondents do not maintain that any OPD
employee either violated the law him-or-herself or knew or
should have known that Arch Wireless, by turning over the
transcript, would have violated the law. The otherwise
reasonable search by OPD is not rendered unreasonable by
the assumption that Arch Wireless violated the SCA by
turning over the transcripts.215
Given that this provided the Court with an adequate ground to
reject the plaintiffs' SCA-based argument, there was no need for
the Court to write so dismissively about the statute, which makes
its denigration of the SCA doubly disturbing.
5. Conclusion; Lip Service Deference to Justice Scalia's
O'Connor Concurrence
Justice Kennedy concluded his lengthy application of the
O'Connor plurality approach 216 thus: "Because the search was
motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose, and because it
was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable under the
approach of the O'Connor plurality."217 His majority opinion then
added the following sentence:
For these same reasons-that the employer had a legitimate
reason for the search, and that the search was not excessively
intrusive in light of that justification-the Court also
concludes that the search would be "regarded as reasonable
and normal in the private-employer context" and would
satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia's concurrence.218
215 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010).
216 Part III.B of the Court's opinion is 1488 words long (according to the
WordPerfect word-counting function), of which almost 1100 words are devoted to the
Court's application of the O'Connor plurality approach.
217 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)).
218 Id. at 2633 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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Part III-B ends thus: "The search was reasonable, and the Court
of Appeals erred by holding to the contrary. Petitioners did not
violate Quon's Fourth Amendment rights."219
F. Justice Scalia's Quon Concurrence
Justice Scalia made it quite clear in his concurring opinion220
that he was not mollified by the majority's passing reference to his
O'Connor concurrence. 221 First, he asserted his continued
conviction that the "operational realities" rubric for determining
the Fourth Amendment's application to public employees invented
by the plurality in O'Connor v. Ortega222 is standard-less and
unsupported. "In this case," he insisted, "the proper threshold
inquiry should be not whether the Fourth Amendment applies to
messages on public employees' employer-issued pagers, but
whether it applies in general to such messages on employer-issued
pagers." 2 23 This passage in Justice Scalia's concurrence was
uncharacteristically poorly drafted. The Fourth Amendment has
always been understood to apply only to searches and seizures by
the government or its agents, not to the conduct of private persons
or entities. 224 Presumably what he meant was that "the proper
threshold inquiry should be not whether [a reasonable expectation
219 Id.
220 Id. at 2634.
221 See supra Part III.E.5.
222 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. at 717). Referring to this concept, the Quon majority commented, "were we to
assume that inquiry into 'operational realities' were called for," it would be necessary
to determine whether Lt. Duke's informal assurance concerning text messages created
an expectation of privacy. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
223 Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
224 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (holding that the Fourth Amendment,
and its exclusionary rule, are "a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and . . . not . . . a limitation upon other than governmental agencies."). They do not,
therefore, apply to the acts of "a private individual not acting as an agent of the
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official."
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citing Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 662 (1980)). Thus, if someone was acting as an informant at the time he
conducted a search, his conduct is measured against Fourth Amendment standards.
But if a private person or entity is acting strictly on his, her, or its own initiative, it
may turn over the information or evidence thus obtained, and it is admissible at trial
even if the private conduct, if it had been done by a government agent, would have
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g., id.
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of privacy exists with regard] to messages on public employees'
employer-issued pagers, but whether [such an expectation exists]
in general [with regard to] such messages on employer-issued
pagers."
Second, Justice Scalia wrote, given the Court's unanimous
conclusion under both approaches that the OPD's review of Quon's
text messages was reasonable, it was unnecessary and misleading
for the Court to provide its lengthy application of the O'Connor
plurality approach. By discussing the O'Connor plurality approach
at such length, Justice Scalia complained, the Court was hinting,
or at least would be perceived as hinting, that this approach was
the governing law. 22 5
IV. WHAT THE COURT DID NOT DECIDE, AND WHY:
EXPECTATIONS AND STANDARDS
Having reviewed what the Court did decide, this Article now
addresses the more interesting issues: what the Court did not
decide (including some that were not before the Court). First,
against what standard should a government employee's privacy
expectations be measured-the O'Connor plurality approach,
Justice Scalia's approach, or neither-and whether "[t]he
principles applicable to a government employer's search of an
employee's physical office apply with at least the same force when
the employer intrudes on the employee's privacy in the electronic
sphere?" 2 2 6 Second, suppose the jury had found, as Quon
maintained, that his OPD superiors' real reason for reviewing his
text messages was to investigate suspicions of wrongdoing on his
225 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010).
Despite the Court's insistence that it is agnostic about the proper test, lower
courts will likely read the Court's self-described "'instructive' expatiation on
how the O'Connor plurality's approach would apply here (if it applied), as a
heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed. Litigants will do likewise,
using the threshold question whether the Fourth Amendment is even
implicated as a basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments about
employer policies, how they were communicated, and whether they were
authorized, as well as the latest trends in employees' use of electronic media.
In short, in saying why it is not saying more, the Court says much more than
it should.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
226 Id. at 2630 (emphasis added).
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part-would the review, as conducted, still be reasonable? Third,
can someone who exchanges text messages, e-mail or the like with
a government employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy
as to those messages, even if the employee does not?
A. Measuring Expectations of Electronic Privacy
1. The Majority's Waffle: Part III.A of the Court's Opinion
In Part III.A of his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
provided a lengthy explanation of why it would not decide whether
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 227 First, Justice
Kennedy issued a paean to judicial restraint:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the
whole concept of privacy expectations in communications
made on electronic equipment owned by a government
employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on
the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear. 228
His majority opinion then identified the many uncertainties that
the issue raised:
Even if the Court were certain that the O'Connor plurality's
approach were the right one, the Court would have difficulty
predicting how employees' privacy expectations will be shaped
by those changes or the degree to which society will be
prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable. Cell
phone and text message communications are so pervasive
that some persons may consider them to be essential means
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of
those devices has made them generally affordable, so one
could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar
devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their
own. And employer policies concerning communications will
of course shape the reasonable expectations of their
227 Id. Part III.A is nearly 900 words long, of which nearly 800 are devoted to the
explanation.
228 Id. at 2629.
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employees, especially to the extent that such policies are
clearly communicated. 229
This passage is significant for several reasons.230 First, it
acknowledges uncertainty as to whether the O'Connor plurality
approach is the right one. 2 3 1 Second, it also recognizes that what
happens in the non-governmental workplace will, to some extent,
shape what expectations will be reasonable in the government
workplace-a concession that appears to be more than just an
attempt to mollify Justice Scalia. Third, it acknowledges that no
social consensus exists yet as to what privacy expectations might
be reasonable in connection with emerging electronic
communication media, let alone what expectations might be
reasonable concerning their use in the workplace, whether private
or governmental. The Court noted that "many employers expect or
at least tolerate personal use of such equipment by employees
because it often increases worker efficiency," 2 32 and also noted
that at least a few states have enacted statutes that require
employers to notify employees concerning when their electronic
communications would be monitored. 233
The pros and cons of the Court's decision not to decide are
discussed in Part IV.A.3, infra.
2 Id. at 2630 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715) (citations omitted).
230 Even though the Court decided nothing in this regard, Justice Kennedy's
comments on this issue, and Justice Scalia's response, probably garnered more media
attention than any other aspect of the case. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment, New Technologies, and the Case for Caution, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr.
20, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/20/fourth-amendment-and-new-
technologies-and-the-case-for-caution/; see also, Adam Liptak, Justices are Long on
Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html?-r=1.
231 If five or more of the seven Justices who signed Justice Kennedy's opinion firmly
believed that the O'Connor plurality approach was how the law should address these
issues, they could have said so.
232 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (citing Brief of Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (08-
1332), 2010 WL 1063463, at *16-20).
233 Id. at 2630 (citing Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Association As
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (08-1332), 2010 WL 1186480, at *22). The Brief in turn cited DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 705 (2005), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2003). See infra note
271 for a brief summary of these provisions.
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2. Justice Scalia's "I Told You So"
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, agreed that "there is no
need to answer [the] threshold question" about whether the
plaintiffs had a constitutional expectation of privacy, because even
if they did, the OPD's review of Quon's messages was
reasonable. 234 But since no need existed to decide that "threshold
question," Justice Scalia protested, there was no need for the
Court to address it at all.2 3 5 He predicted that the Court's
unnecessary discussion of how the O'Connor plurality approach
might apply to the issue would lead to mischief and confusion
among litigators and lower court judges. 2 3 6 Moreover, he argued,
the majority inadvertently demonstrated the inadequacies of the
O'Connor plurality formula:
[I]n fleshing out its fears that applying that test to new
technologies will be too hard, the Court underscores the
unworkability of that standard. Any rule that requires
evaluating whether a given gadget is a "necessary
instrumen[t] for self-expression, even self-identification, on
top of assessing the degree to which the law's treatment of
[workplace norms has] evolve[d]," is (to put it mildly) unlikely
to yield objective answers. 237
Justice Scalia also suggested that the majority exaggerated the
difficulties in the question, and acerbically reminded his
colleagues that, difficult or not, a case may someday arise that will
require that issue to be addressed: "Applying the Fourth
Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but
when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice.
The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of
duty."238
234 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
235 "To whom do we owe an additional explanation for declining to decide an issue,
once we have explained that [the issue] makes no difference?" Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
236 Id.; see supra Part III.F.
237 Id. at 2635 (Scalia. J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2629-30
(majority opinion)).
238 Id. The phrase Justice Scalia used-"the times they are a changin"'-is the title
and refrain of a song Bob Dylan wrote in the fall of 1963, which captured the mood of
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3. Evaluation; Comparing the Two Approaches
Despite Justice Scalia's scornful criticism, the Court's
restraint was probably a good thing, for a variety of reasons. First,
it appears from the oral argument that several of the Justices
were confused or unclear as to how these pagers worked. 239 For
example, some of the Justices may not have been aware that
messages were sent through, and stored on, Arch Wireless's
computers, rather than going directly from the sender's pager to
the recipient's like a phone call. 2 4 0 An understanding of this
technology would certainly prove useful, if not essential, in
analyzing the degree to which privacy expectations in such
messages would be reasonable. 241
Second, at least some prominent scholars worried publicly
that a broad decision on the privacy expectation issues in Quon
many during that troubled and tempestuous period. The basic message of the song is
summarized in this verse:
Come mothers and fathers/ Throughout the land/ And don't criticize/ What you
can't understand/ Your sons and your daughters/ Are beyond your command/
Your old road is rapidly agin'/ Please get out of the new one if you can't lend
your hand/ For the times they are a-changin'
The Times They Are A-Changin', BOBDYLAN, http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/times-
they-are-changin (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). For a concise description of the song, its
references and significance, see OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE
BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 624-27 (2004).
239 During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked, "Maybe-maybe everybody
else knows this, but what is the difference between the pager and the e-mail?"
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 28-1332).
240 During the presentation for the plaintiffs, Chief Justice Roberts asked, "Well, I
didn't-I wouldn't think that. I thought, you know, you push a button; it goes right to
the other thing." Id. at 48. Justice Scalia chimed in: "You mean it doesn't go right to the
other thing?" Id. Counsel explained: "It's-I mean, it's like with e-mails. When we send
an e-mail, that goes through some e-mail provider, whether it be AOL or Yahoo, it's
going through some service provider. . . ." Id.
241 Unlike a telephone call, electronic communication technology requires the sender
and receiver's ISP's to retain a copy of the contents of an electronic communication at
least for a time (The technology is described in Part IIB, supra.). ECPA authorizes
ISPs to access the contents of customers' messages with no significant restrictions, so
long as the ISP does not disclose those contents to others. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006);
see also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, § 7:20. Commercial ISPs agree
contractually not to do so; otherwise they would lose customers to competitors who do
promise to respect their customers' privacy; but when an employer acts as ISP for its
employees, it has less motive to make such a promise, and may have valid business or
official reasons to monitor certain uses of its equipment and systems.
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might put the law into a straightjacket that could cause enormous
problems as technology, and society's attitudes toward that
technology evolve. 242 As the Court acknowledged, society is still in
the process of sorting out how these issues should be addressed. 243
Justice Scalia's approach-that a government employee's
constitutional right to privacy in the workplace should be the
same as the legal privacy rights of employees in the private
workplace-has its attractions. First, it provides courts with an
already existing body of law to apply (assuming that body of law is
of sufficient clarity) rather than requiring judges to grope in a
vacuum. Second, it avoids creating an artificial distinction which
arguably serves no real purpose. Assume two professors' offices
and computers are searched by the universities at which they
teach, each case involving suspected violations of similar school
rules and regulations. Why should a professor at a public
university enjoy any greater, lesser, or different right to privacy in
242 It may be significant that Professor Orin Kerr, who is generally and deservedly
acknowledged as one of the nation's leading legal experts on the SCA and on electronic
communications generally, wrote several blog entries during the pendency of the case
urging the Court not to offer a broad ruling governing expectations of privacy; and that
in 2003, Professor Kerr took a leave of absence from George Washington Law School to
serve as a law clerk for Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Court's opinion in Quon. See
Orin Kerr, Communicating With Those Who Have No Privacy Rights: The Hard
Question in City of Ontario v. Quon, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:50 AM),
http://volokh.com/2010/03/31/communicating-with-those-who-have-no-privacy-rights-
the-hard-question-in-city-of-ontario-v-quon/; Orin Kerr, Some Thoughts on the Reply
Brief in City of Ontario v. Quon, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 13, 2010, 7:58 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/04/13/some-thoughts-on-the-reply-brief-in-city-of-ontario-v-
quon/; Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Grants Cert on Fourth Amendment Protection in Text
Messages, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2009, 12:29 PM), http://volokh.com/
2009/12/14/supreme-court-grants-cert-on-fourth-amendment-protection-in-text-
messages/; Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, New Technologies, and the Case for
Caution, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 20, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/
04/20/fourth-amendment-and-new-technologies-and-the-case-for-caution/; Orin Kerr,
Thoughts on the Oral Argument in City of Ontario v. Quon, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr.
19, 2010, 1:44 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/04/19/thoughts-on-the-oral-argument-in-
city-of-ontario-v-quon/; Orin Kerr, Will the Supreme Court Rethink Public Employee
Privacy Rights in Quon?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2009, 10:00 PM),
http://volokh.com/2009/12/14/will-the-supreme-court-rethink-public-employee-privacy-
rights-in-quon/. Other scholars made similar arguments in the lead-up to the Quon
decision. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Ninth Circuit Finds Fourth Amendment Protection
in Text Messages, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 18, 2008, 4:39 PM), http://volokh.com/
2008/06/18/ninth-circuit-finds-fourth-amendment-protection-in-text-messages/.
243 See supra notes 220-42 and accompanying text; infra notes 244-74 and
accompanying text.
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her office, than would a professor at a private university? Why
should the applicable legal standard be any different? Justice
Scalia's approach argues that the standards should be the same.
The question arises: Is there a significant difference between
the O'Connor plurality approach, and Justice Scalia's tort law,
employment law standard?
The common law tort of invasion of privacy is generally
divided into four different kinds of wrongdoing: (1) intrusion upon
seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity
placing a person in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of a
person's name or likeness. 244 Another tort often associated with
these is the intentional, reckless or negligent infliction of
emotional damage. 245 The latter four actions are based upon what
a defendant did with information once it was obtained; the first,
intrusion upon seclusion, is the common law tort that parallels the
plaintiffs' claims in Quon.
Restatement of Torts, Second § 652B, Intrusion Upon
Seclusion, defines that tort as follows: "One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."2 4 6
Applied to a private sector workplace, to make out a prima
facie case for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the employer intruded
into plaintiffs subjective expectation of privacy; that this
expectation was one that society would view as reasonable; that,
under the circumstances, society would view the intrusion as
highly offensive;247 and that the employer had no reasonable
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977); see also William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 31, 389 (1960).
245 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 45-46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007)
(intentional or reckless infliction and negligent infliction).
246 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
247 Richard E. Kaye, Cause of Action to Recover Damages for Invasion of Private
Sector Employee's Privacy by Intrusion upon Seclusion, in 42 CAUSE OF ACTION 2d 255,
§§ 4-5 (West 2009); see also L. Camille Hebert, 1 EMP. PRIVACY L. § 8:13 (West 2010)
(Employer searches as invasion of privacy: "[A] plaintiff generally is required to
establish that the employer committed an unauthorized intrusion into the seclusion of
the plaintiff that would be offensive to an ordinary person."). Another useful source
may be available in the not-to-distant future. A Westlaw search of the RESTATEMENT
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business justification for the intrusion.248 In other words, the
plaintiff must establish that (1) the employer engaged in a highly
offensive intrusion upon the employee's privacy, and that (2) the
intrusion was unjustified under the circumstances. 249
First let us compare the common law tort and the O'Connor
plurality approach with regard to the nature of the intrusion. The
O'Connor plurality requires a plaintiff to produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding 250 that her government employer
intruded into her Fourth Amendment-protected reasonable
expectation of privacy; in assessing whether the plaintiff has met
this burden, a court must consider "the operational realities of the
workplace."251 This closely parallels the first element of the
common law tort action. It is perhaps a bit easier for the public
employee to establish the "intrusion" element of her cause of
action under the O'Connor plurality approach because, unlike the
private sector employee, she need not establish that the intrusion
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (database REST-EMPL) for the word "privacy" produces
a handful of sections in Chapter 4, each of which promises, "Issues of employee privacy
are examined in Chapter 7 of this Restatement." However, accessing the
RESTATEMENT's table of contents (by clicking on "table of contents" on the left, about a
third of the way down from the top of the screen) reveals that at present the
RESTATEMENT consists of only chapters 1-6 and chapter 8. I've been guilty of being
tardy with a manuscript or two, so I didn't laugh too loudly when I noticed that.
248 Kaye, supra note 247, § 7. Other defenses, including consent, are discussed in
Kaye. Id. §6.
249 Id. §§ 4-7.
250 "Sufficient to support a finding" is the burden of proof a party must satisfy in
order to avoid a summary judgment against it at the pleading stage, or a directed
verdict at the trial stage. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 175-76
(1970) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Law Co., Inc. v. Mohawk Const. & Supply Co., Inc.,
577 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2009); FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c). In O'Connor, the trial judge
granted summary judgment for the defendants. Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703, 704
(9th Cir. 1985). This amounts to a ruling that, granting all of Dr. Ortega's factual
allegations, he had failed to satisfy this burden. The Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that
Dr. Ortega did indeed satisfy his burden of showing an intrusion into his Fourth
Amendment-protected privacy and that the defendants failed to satisfy its burden of
producing evidence that its conduct was justified. Id. at 707. The Ninth Circuit
therefore granted summary judgment for Dr. Ortega on the liability issue, and
remanded for a trial strictly on the issue of damages. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit decision that Dr. Ortega had satisfied his burden of production as to
the intrusion, but concluded that a material issue of fact existed as to whether the
intrusion was reasonable, and remanded for trial. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
728-29 (1986); see supra note 101 for the ultimate disposition of Dr. Ortega's law suit.
251 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 709-10; see supra Part II.B.
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was "highly offensive," but unless the intrusion was in fact highly
offensive, plaintiffs suit is unlikely to succeed, either as a matter
of law,252 or as a factual issue for the jury.
With regard to the justification issue-here, too, the
differences between the two bodies of law, if they exist, appear to
be minor at most. If plaintiff satisfies her burden of production as
to the intrusion, tort law and the O'Connor plurality both place
the burden on the employer to establish that the intrusion is
justified. Each recognizes that as a general matter, an intrusion is
justified if the employer had a valid reason-busineSs253 or
governmental 254-for it. The O'Connor plurality's two-part test
adds a bit of flesh to the skeleton, but its two considerations-
"first. . . whether the . . . action was justified at its inception," and
"second . . . whether the search as actually conducted was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place"255-are just as relevant in the
private sector workplace as the governmental workplace. 256
Each body of law also recognizes an additional defense,
besides justification-consent. 2 7 In the context of electronic
communications media, most courts have held that so long as the
employer gives the employee specific notice that the employer
reserves the right to monitor or review her use of employer-
supplied equipment, her use of it constituted implicit consent to
the monitoring or review.258 In this context, as in the law
enforcement context, 2 5 9 the word "consent," in its everyday
252 If the plaintiff establishes only that her government employer made only a minor
intrusion into her privacy, the agency will not have to establish much of a justification
for it to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
253 Kaye, supra note 247, § 7.
254 See infra note 255-56 and accompanying text.
255 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726; see supra Part II.B.
256 "[Tlhe sufficiency of an employer's business justification for intruding on
employees' privacy is a function of (1) the validity and veracity of the economic or
health/safety rationales for the intrusion; and (2) whether the means or methods used
were proportionate to the employer's purported justification for the intrusion." Kaye,
supra note 247, § 7; see id. §§ 8-24 (reviewing the law as it applies to a variety of
information-gathering techniques and the justifications asserted by employers).
257 Concerning the private sector workplace, see Kaye supra note 247, § 6.
Concerning consent generally as a defense to civil or criminal charges of unlawful
electronic surveillance, see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 5:101-5:107.
258 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, § 6:5.
259 See supra Part I.A.2.
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meaning, does not accurately reflect reality. "Consent" implies a
choice. Here the employee's choice is stark: agree to the employer's
policy, or lose the job.26 0
Many government agencies and private sector employers now
require employees to sign a statement acknowledging that they
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their use of the
employer's communications equipment and systems. 261 If an
employer asked my advice on this matter, I would recommend
that every employee be required to sign such a statement,262 and
would also advise the client to order supervisory personnel not to
make any "informal" or "off-the-record" assurances to the
contrary.263 The odds are that this practice is, or soon will become,
so pervasive and routine that employees are unlikely to have
grounds to sue either a government employer based on the Fourth
Amendment, or a private sector employer based on intrusion upon
seclusion. 264 Such suits are likely to arise only against small,
unsophisticated employers, and in cases where, like Quon, a
supervisor gives employees "unofficial" or "off-the-record"
assurances that, despite the official policy, no monitoring or
review will be conducted. 265
260 See, e.g., Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1041-42 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding
that an employee's submission of a urine sample, in compliance with his employer's
drug testing policy, constituted consent and therefore a defense under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 652B (2011), even though his refusal would have cost him his job).
261 See generally WILLIAM S. HUBBARD, The NEW BATTLE OVER WORKPLACE PRIVACY
ch. 7 (1998); MICHAEL R. OVERLY, E-POLICY: HOW To DEVELOP COMPUTER, E-MAIL, AND
INTERNET GUIDELINES TO PROTECT YOUR COMPANY AND ITS ASSETS (1999).
262 For examples of such statements, see the books cited in the previous note.
263 I would also advise the client: (1) not to monitor or review an employee's use of
the equipment unless a good business reason presented itself; (2) where the need
arises, monitor or review in a way that minimizes the intrusion into the employee's
privacy to the extent reasonably practicable; (3) restrict dissemination of the
information obtained to those with a clear need to know; and (4) use the information as
discreetly as possible.
264 If the employer makes inappropriate disclosure or use of the information
obtained from the monitoring or review, this may give the employee a cause of action
for example for public disclosure of private facts, false light, etc. See supra notes 244-46
and accompanying text.
265 It is easy to understand what motivated Lt. Duke to give his informal assurance
to the members of the OPD SWAT team. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying
text. He had no desire to snoop on the members of the SWAT team, and saw no harm in
reassuring them of that. But if he had not made his informal reassurances, perhaps
Quon would have been more discrete in his use of the pager; and if not, in all likelihood
the district court and Ninth Circuit would have dismissed the plaintiffs' law suit on the
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4. The Need for Legislation
Given that the O'Connor plurality approach and the common
law regarding right to privacy in the workplace so closely
resemble each other, does it really matter which ultimately
becomes the law governing privacy in the governmental
workplace?
I believe it does. To assess the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of government conduct solely by what is done by
employers in non-government workplaces would be an abdication
of the government's and (at least, in the absence of congressional
legislation the Supreme Court's) responsibility to determine what
intrusions by the government into individual privacy are
reasonable. As Justice Brandeis famously admonished eight
decades ago, "[o]ur government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example."2 66 The Quon majority recognized that it would be wrong
for the Court to ignore what is happening in the non-government
workplace,267 but there is merit to the proposition, implicit in the
O'Connor plurality approach, that the Fourth Amendment should
not blindly follow the practices of the private sector. This is
particularly so given that, regarding workplace privacy (among
other employment matters), private employers often can pretty
much set whatever rules they please, because workers lack the
individual or collective power to object. 2 6 8
ground that Quon, and those with whom he texted, had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the first place.
266 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(protesting the admission at trial of evidence obtained by unlawful wiretaps by federal
agents).
267 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010).
268 Federal and state law do protect workers in many fundamental ways, but from
what experts in the field tell me, there is no explicit body of labor law legislation that
addresses these issues. Labor unions can insist on some degree of protection of worker
privacy, but can do so only in industries that are heavily unionized, and in recent
decades, unions have represented a shrinking portion of the labor market. According to
the Census Bureau's Statistical Abstract of the United States 2011, in 1985, nearly 17
million workers were union members and more than 19 million were covered by union
contracts-18% and 20% of the labor market respectively; by 2009 those numbers had
diminished to 15 million and 16.9 million (12.3% and 13.6%). This decline is even more
noteworthy considering that the nation's population grew by roughly 70 million people
during the intervening quarter century. Moreover, while in 1985, nearly two-thirds of
those whose jobs were covered by unions were private sector workers, by 2009 less than
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According to data collected by the American Management
Association (AMA), private sector employers are monitoring their
employees more than ever before. According to the AMA's 2007
Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey, 66% of employers
monitor their employees' Internet connections, 65% of companies
use software to block connections to inappropriate Web sites, 43%
of companies monitor e-mail, 45% monitor time spent on the
telephone and numbers called, 16% record phone conversations,
and almost half (48%) of the companies surveyed use video
monitoring to counter theft, violence, and sabotage. 269
Given these complexities, defining privacy expectations
should be the responsibility of Congress, not the Court.270
Legislative models exist from which Congress could construct a
reasonable regime. As the Court noted in Quon, at least two state
statutes require employers to notify employees in advance if they
plan to monitor or review employees' use of employer-provided
communications equipment, or if it reserves the right to do so.271
half were private sector workers-a total of 8.2 million. Given that fewer workers in
the private sector are in industries with a strong union presence, most private sector
workers will have little leverage to bargain for greater privacy. The labor statistics in
this footnote are found in the CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 429 tbl. 663. The
population figures for 1985 and 2009 may be found at Population Estimates: Historical
Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/national/national.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2012).
269 Kaye, supra note 247, at 290. According to the AMA, of the 304 U.S. companies
that participated in the survey: 27% represent companies employing 100 or fewer
workers, 101-500 employees (27%), 501-1000 (12%), 1001-2500 (12%), 2501-5000 (10%),
and 5001 or more (12%). AM. MGMT. ASS'N, 2007 ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND
SURVEILLANCE SURVEY 12 (2008), available at http://www.amanet.org/download.
aspx?filename=%2fimages%2felectronic-monitoring-surveillance-survey8.pdf&pid=41.
270 I write this sentence assuming that Congress will somehow find the time to
devote to anything other than not resolving the nation's debt ceiling and fiscal crises (I
originally wrote the preceding sentence in late July 2011, as the fiscal apocalypse
(defaulting on the nation's debt) drew nigh. In light of the temporary, jury-rigged
"compromise" that was ultimately struck, I see no reason to revise it.).
271 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (West 2005)). Each statute requires advance written or electronic
notice to the employee. CONN. GEN. STAT. 31-48d(b) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
705(b) (West 2005). Each authorizes a state agency to impose a civil penalty on an
employer who fails to comply with the provision. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48f (2003);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(d) (West 2005) (specifying in the latter provision that the
civil penalty is not an exclusive remedy and does not preclude a suit for damages under
any other state or federal law). Each statute contains exceptions where the monitoring
or review is conducted in cooperation with law enforcement officials. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-48d(d) (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (West 2005).
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Many (perhaps most) federal agencies already provide such notice;
Congress should make this mandatory. Beyond this basic step,
consider the federal statute that regulates the interception of
telephone calls. Although Title III is not a model of clarity in this
regard, in essence it permits employers (whether in the private or
governmental sectors) to surreptitiously monitor an employee's
phone conversations only if, and to the extent, that it has a valid
business purpose to do so. Excessive monitoring violates the
statute and therefore is civilly actionable. 272 A similar regime
would serve as well with regard to electronic communications,
including e-mails, text messages, and the like. 273
The federal government has attempted to encourage and
inspire states and private entities to emulate it in a variety of
contexts. 274 It is plausible to argue that, with regard to workplace
privacy, Congress should take the initiative to set an example that
enlightened non-government employers might choose to follow.
Until it does, the O'Connor plurality approach to the issue, for all
its vagueness and other shortcomings, is preferable to Justice
Scalia's.
272 The preceding sentence is a very brief summation of a somewhat complex
subject. See FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 6:3-6:13. Moreover, an employer
may deprive employees of this protection merely by informing them that all calls may
be monitored. As a general rule, an employee who uses a phone while on notice that it
may be monitored is deemed to have consented to the monitoring. See id. § 6:5.
273 Even if such a statute was enacted applying this approach to electronic
communications media generally, and was made applicable to the private sector as well
as to the government, employers could frustrate such a statute by requiring employees
to sign an acknowledgement that they have no expectation of privacy when they use
employer-supplied communications media. Even so, such a statute might have the
aspirational impact of encouraging employers to act reasonably with regard to
employee privacy.
274 See, for example, Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. § 248 (2009), on Federal
Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, setting forth the
administration's plan to lead by example in the area of energy conservation and
environmentally sensitive operations. Similarly, see the Telework Enhancement Act of
2010, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2010), setting forth the government's policy for allowing
federal employees to telecommute and encouraging the private sector to do the same.
See Steve Vogel, Report Urges U.S. Government To Boost Workplace Flexibility, WASH.
POST (May 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2 0 0 9/
05/13/AR2009051303688.html (relating that a government report that led to the
enactment of that statute urged the federal government to "lead by example" by
including flexible work arrangements).
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B. Suppose the Jury Had Found That the Review Was to
Investigate Suspicions of Quon's Wrongdoing
At trial, the plaintiffs claimed that the real reason OPD
personnel reviewed Sgt. Quon's text transcripts was to investigate
suspicions of wrongdoing on his part, but the jury found that the
review was motivated only by concerns over the adequacy of the
OPD's contract with Arch. 2 7 5 Cases no doubt have arisen or will
arise, however, in which an agency monitors or examines an
employee's use of government-provided electronic communication
equipment to investigate possible wrongdoing. Thus, it is worth
considering how this might have affected the Court's resolution of
the issues in Quon.
At first glance, the answer might be: not at all. In O'Connor,
after all, the plurality opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence
each emphasized that their approaches applied whether the
agency's search was for a needed file, or to investigate suspicions
of employee wrongdoing. 276 In the latter situation, depending on
what the employee is suspected of doing, the agency's need to act
quickly might be more compelling than existed in Quon.2 77 On the
other hand, where the employee is suspected only of occasional
use of the equipment to send and receive personal messages while
on duty, the need for immediate action by the agency is less
compelling. The agency, moreover, would have reason to suspect
that the monitoring or review would reveal some personal details
of the employee's life. In Quon, the Court, in upholding the
reasonableness of the OPD's review of Quon's text messages,
stressed that at the outset the OPD did not anticipate that the
messages would include highly personal information.278
Given the unique facts in Quon-that he was told officially
that he had no expectation of privacy in the messages; that he was
given only informal assurances to the contrary; and that the
nature of his job made it likely that some of his messages, at any
rate, might become relevant evidence if a SWAT team action ever
lead to litigation-I suspect the Court would have held that the
275 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Part HI.C.1 (plurality opinion) and II.C.2 (Justice Scalia's concurrence).
277 Such would be the case, for example, if the employee was suspected of using the
device to harass other individuals or reveal confidential information to outsiders.
278 See supra Part III.E.2.
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OPD's review of Quon's messages was reasonable even if the jury
had concluded that the OPD reviewed Quon's messages to
investigate suspicions that he was engaging in some kind of
misfeasance. But professorial speculation is small comfort to
public officials who must make on-the-spot decisions.
C. Privacy Expectations of Those With Whom Quon Texted
Given, as the Court unanimously agreed, that OPD's review
of Sgt. Quon's text messages did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights, the question remained: did it violate the
rights of the other plaintiffs? In Part III.C of the majority opinion,
the Court acknowledged this issue, noting that the plaintiffs and
defendants "disagree[d] whether a sender of a text message can
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a message he
knowingly sends to someone's employer-provided pager."27 9 It was
not necessary for the Court to address that issue, however,
because the other plaintiffs based their case solely on the theory
that the OPD review violated Sgt. Quon's rights and, derivatively,
their own.280 Once the Court rejected Sgt. Quon's Fourth
Amendment case, the other plaintiffs' claims also fell. 281
The Court's refusal to discuss the issue was correct given the
facts, and, given the facts, it is easy to assume that the other
plaintiffs did not press any claims independent of Sgt. Quon's
because they all knew Sgt. Quon was using a pager issued by the
OPD. This aspect of the case would have been far more interesting
if one of Sgt. Quon's text-correspondents did not know that the
sergeant was using an OPD device to send and receive the
messages.
Suppose, for example, a police department (PD) provided an
officer with a pager, or a cell phone with text messaging ability,
for use on official business. The officer used it to exchange
sexually explicit messages with a woman who was not an
employee of the PD and was unaware that the officer was using a
279 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2633 (2010).
280 Id. In fact, all four plaintiffs (Quon, his wife, his girlfriend, and Sgt. Trujillo)
were represented by the same attorney before the Court.
281 Id. On this point, the Court was unanimous-neither Justice Scalia nor Justice
Stevens commented on this aspect of the decision.
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device issued to him by the PD. 282 After awhile, the PD decided,
for legitimate departmental reasons, to review the officer's text
messages, and did so in a reasonable manner, and thereby
discovered the contents of the officer's and the woman's messages.
The officer would have no Fourth Amendment claim against the
PD for a variety of reasons. 283 Might the woman have a Fourth
Amendment claim against the department, independent of the
officer's?
At first blush, the answer is clearly no-if it was reasonable
for the PD to review the text messages the officer sent and
received, it logically follows that both sides of each exchange come
within the scope of the review. This follows the approach the law
applies to the surreptitious interception of communications
authorized by Title III: if the authorities obtain a lawful tap or
bug and execute it lawfully, the intercepted communications are
admissible against each participant-those named in the
application and intercept order, and also those, originally
unknown, who are overheard engaging in crime-related
conversations. 2 84 This logic arguably applies with equal force to an
after-the-fact review of an employee's messages lawfully
conducted pursuant to the Fourth Amendment's special needs
doctrine-Or does it?
Title III authorizes the surreptitious interception of a
suspect's wire, oral, or electronic communications, because the
interception must be surreptitious if the government is to have
any realistic chance of achieving its authorized goals-common
sense suggests that a criminal will not plan or discuss his criminal
activities over a phone that he knows is tapped or in a premises
282 1 am using this gender line-up in my hypothetical for convenience, and to
parallel the facts in Quon. I acknowledge, of course, that the roles might be
reversed-she might be the police officer and he might be the civilian; or they could
both be of the same gender.
283 If he had been informed that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
messages, and that the PD reserved the right to review them, that would be enough to
deprive him of Fourth Amendment protection. Even if he did have some right to
privacy, it presumably would be limited for the reasons the Court discussed in Quon.
See supra Part III.E.2. Finally, even assuming he had some reasonable expectation of
privacy, if the PD had a valid reason to review those messages and did so in a
reasonable manner, although its review would intrude into his privacy, it would not
violate it.
284 See generally FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§ 8:27-8:34.
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that he knows is bugged.285 Often, the officers reasonably expect,
or learn as the investigation progresses, that many, even most, of
those with whom the initial targets converse are also engaged in
crime. Moreover, an interception order authorizes the interception
only of communications relevant to the crimes under
investigation; if the police learn that a particular individual is not
involved in criminal activity, they must "minimize" the
interception of his or her conversations. 286
None of these circumstances, assumptions, or restrictions
would apply to the woman in my hypothetical. Unlike the person
who meets with, calls, or receives calls from a suspected drug
dealer whose office is bugged or whose phone is tapped, there is no
basis to assume that she is engaged in any wrongdoing.287 More
important, the PD has no compelling reason to avoid informing
those with whom the officer texts, that he is using a PD device and
the messages are subject to PD review.288 Indeed, serving such
notice would enhance the PD's interests, because it would
285 Common sense is not always an accurate predictor of how people actually
behave. Prison and jail inmates and those with whom they converse are on notice that
their phone calls will be monitored or recorded, as will their face-to-face visits. Despite
these warnings, many prisoners do use prison phones or face-to-face visits to discuss or
plan crimes, and recordings of those conversations are routinely admitted into evidence
against the participants in the conversations . .. (Perhaps these prisoners and those
with whom they converse are not very bright, or perhaps they have a remarkable
facility for denying reality, or are simply too bored to care.). For a discussion of the
various legal theories justifying this result, see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10,
§§ 6:42-6:57; admissibility of the recordings against the non-prisoner participant is
discussed id. §§ 6:51 (phone calls) and §§ 6:53-6:54 (oral communications during prison
visits).
286 Title 18 U.S.C. §2518(5) (2006) requires each interception order to contain a
directive "that the authorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise" relevant to the
investigation. It is universally acknowledged, of course, that even under the best of
circumstances, some irrelevant conversations will be intercepted and recorded,
including many involving people not engaged in criminal activity. For a detailed
discussion of the "minimization clause," see FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 10, §§
8:101-8:107. For a discussion of how law enforcement officials should attempt to comply
with the minimization provision, see id. ch. 15. For a discussion of the issues that arise
at a pretrial "minimization hearing," see id. §§ 35:50-35:74.
287 If she is aware that the officer is married, her conduct in exchanging sexually
explicit text messages with him is immoral, but of itself, that is no business of the PD's,
and she should not thereby forfeit an otherwise protected expectation of privacy.
288 Obviously exceptions exist, such as where the officer is acting "under cover" of a
different identity for investigative purposes.
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(presumably) discourage others from sending personal messages
to that device.
As a rule, whenever we make or receive a phone call, or send
or receive an e-mail or text message, we assume that its privacy is
legally and technologically protected. Those of us who are
knowledgeable about the law or communications technology are
aware that there are many ways in which that privacy may be
breached; 289 but in general, the only real risk is that the person
with whom we are communicating will share what was said with
others.290
There are, of course, situations in which this assumption is
not justified, but usually we are given notice. Many private
companies and public agencies provide such notice on their
telephone lines: after dialing a company or agency number, we
have all heard messages advising us that the call might be
"monitored for quality control purposes" or the like. 2 9 1 Similarly,
many government agencies (and perhaps some companies)
automatically include in each outgoing e-mail a notice to this
effect, 292 or at least an advisory to examine the agency or
company's privacy statement on its Web site. 2 93
289 Some of the legal means are discussed supra Parts I.A.2 and I.B.
290 Each of us has from time to time been the victim of a betrayal of confidentiality;
each of us has committed such a breach. A few decades ago, the betrayals were
generally limited to the immediate acquaintances of those concerned. One of the
dubious blessings of the Internet is that it is now possible for a betrayed confidence to
circulate among thousands and even millions of strangers. See, e.g., T.R. Reid, Thanks
for Last Night! (cc: The Entire World), WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at Cl.
291 This experience is becoming less and less frequent as companies and agencies
switch to automated phone answering systems ("Please make a selection from the
following menu. To start a new subscription, press 1.) designed to prevent a caller
from ever speaking to a human being.
292 Florida's may be the most all-encompassing in this regard. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.01 (West 2012) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records
are open for personal inspection and copying by any person. Providing access
to public records is a duty of each agency.
(2)(a) Automation of public records must not erode the right of access to those
records. As each agency increases its use of and dependence on electronic
recordkeeping, each agency must provide reasonable public access to records
electronically maintained and must ensure that exempt or confidential
records are not disclosed except as otherwise permitted by law.
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Given all this, the woman in our hypothetical has a plausible
argument that the failure to provide her with notice294 falsely
created the impression that her messages with the officer enjoyed
the usual degree of privacy enjoyed by private text messages
between two individuals; and that the absence of such notice
means that the PD intruded upon her Fourth Amendment-
protected reasonable expectations of privacy, even if it did not
intrude upon the officer's.
Including such a notice in all outgoing e-mail and text
messages would not completely protect outsiders from the risk
that a nondescript e-mail address or phone number is actually a
government or corporate device. If I exchange phone numbers
with woman at a social event and decide to send her a rather
personal text message describing the powerful impression she
made on me and how her image haunts my dreams and
fantasies,295 I may have no way of knowing that the number to
which I am texting is her FBI-issued smart phone; that realization
would come only when I receive her reply, with privacy notice
included. If for some reason her superiors at the Bureau are
monitoring her text messages and therefore read what I sent her,
(b) When designing or acquiring an electronic recordkeeping system, an
agency must consider whether such system is capable of providing data in
some common format ...
I have corresponded with a police officer in Florida. The following appears at the end of
each of his e-mails:
PLEASE NOTE: Florida has a very broad public records law (F. S. 119). All e-
mails to and from County Officials are kept as a public record. Your e-mail
communications, including your e-mail address may be disclosed to the public
and media at any time.
Incidentally, the officer informs me that this notice does not appear in each text
message he sends.
293 Even in the absence of such notice, common sense should warn us that when we
receive an e-mail from or send an email to firstname.lastname@megacorp.com or
Jeff.Quon@OntarioPD.gov, given the corporate or governmental nature of the entity
involved, the possibility exists that someone in addition to the named recipient may
read what we send.
294 Such notice need not be elaborate or lengthy. The shortest I've been able to come
up with is: "Official use only. See www.OPD.city/privacy," which consists of forty
characters.
295 This situation is entirely hypothetical. I have been happily married for more
than forty-three years-without interruption, and to the same woman. See supra note
59.
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well, tough luck on me. Government entities and private
employers are not required to do everything conceivably possible
to protect the privacy of those who communicate with their
employees; 296 they should only be required to act reasonably. But
it places no great burden on employers to include a brief notice
about the lack of privacy in all outgoing e-mails, text messages
and the like. Failure to do so might reasonably be held to create
an expectation of privacy.
CONCLUSION
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court could have
clarified many aspects of the law concerning (1) a government
employee's claim that his employer improperly intruded upon his
Fourth Amendment-protected reasonable expectation of privacy,
and (2) the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to an
employee's use of employer-supplied electronic communications
equipment. It chose to resolve neither of these issues. In fact, it
left the law more unsettled than it had been.
As to the first issue, prior to Quon, it had been generally
understood that the plurality opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega was in
fact the law. 2 9 7 In Quon, however, the majority explicitly declined
to endorse this view, instead pointing out that the O'Connor
plurality approach did not capture a majority of the Court, and
that the deciding vote in O'Connor was cast by Justice Scalia, who
rejected the idea of a discrete Fourth Amendment analysis to
govern employer-employee searches, and instead argued that the
law that governs workplace privacy in the non-government sector
should apply as well to the government workplace. 298 The Quon
majority explained why it would not resolve that issue in Quon,2 9 9
and then proceeded to apply the O'Connor plurality approach to
the facts of the case anyway.300
296 Perhaps the technology exists which could interrupt any message I send to an
employee of a government agency or private entity, informing me that all messages
sent from or to that entity's system are subject to review by the entity, and asking
whether, knowing this, I still want to send the e-mail or text message to Z.
297 See Part III, introductory paragraph.
298 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010).
299 Id. at 2629.
3o See supra Part III.E.2.
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As a result, litigants and lower courts now must in essence
litigate and decide the expectation of privacy issue twice: first they
must address the facts of the case as if the O'Connor plurality
approach was the law; second, they must do the same employing
the approach Justice Scalia espoused in his O'Connor and Quon
concurrences. Indeed, courts have begun to do so. 30 1 Fortunately,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, the results will be the same
under both approaches, because the law governing privacy issues
in the non-governmental workplace is nearly indistinguishable
from the Fourth Amendment approach outlined by the O'Connor
plurality. 3 0 2
As to the second issue, there are two compelling reasons why
the Court was probably wise in declining to issue a broad ruling
applying the Fourth Amendment to the use of employer-supplied
electronic communications media in the workplace. First, in
resolving the privacy implications of modern communications
technology, it is helpful to understand how the technology works,
and at least some members of the Court apparently lacked this
knowledge.303 Second, the technology is so new, and is evolving so
quickly, that society's attitudes and expectations with regard to
them are far from settled. Congress, rather than the Court, is the
branch of government best equipped to study and resolve such
issues by legislation, which, unlike a constitutional decision by the
Supreme Court, can be amended to adjust to changing conditions
and expectations.
The facts in Quon suggested, but did not actually present,
two additional issues. First, should the employer be held to a more
exacting standard if its inquiry is based on suspicions of the
employee's misconduct, than if its purpose is merely to review the
efficacy of workplace rules or practices? The logical answer is: It
depends on the nature of the alleged misconduct, and the strength
of the suspicions. 304 Second, assuming the employee lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy, does the government agency
nonetheless have any obligations regarding the privacy
301 See, e.g., True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676, 681-82 (8th Cir. 2010); Richards v. Los
Angeles, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1182-86 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
302 See supra Part IV.A.3.
303 See supra Part III.E.3.
304 See supra Part IV.B.
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expectations of those with whom the employee communicated? A
plausible argument exists that the agency should take reasonable
steps to assure that the non-employee participants in the
communication are informed of the non-private nature of the
communication. 0 5
These are questions of some significance. In the absence of
congressional action (or a Supreme Court decision), private and
public sector employers are in essence resolving them unilaterally,
by requiring, as a condition of employment, that employees
acknowledge that they lack an expectation of privacy regarding
their use of employer-supplied communications equipment and
media.306 Perhaps ultimately this is good public policy-it assures
that employers can intervene to prevent misuse of their
communications media, and it puts employees on notice regarding
personal use such equipment. As the Quon majority
acknowledged, moreover, most people have ample opportunity to
communicate without employer oversight by using their own
personal computers, cellular phones, and "smart" phones with
texting and Internet access, the price of which are now well within
the reach of most Americans.30 7 But privacy is a fundamental and
cherished right in this country.308 Those of us who are employed
tend to spend roughly half of our weekday waking hours at
work.309 It is disquieting that our right to privacy during such an
important and substantial part of our lives is being decided solely
by our employers, based on what they perceive to be their own
self-interest.
305 See supra Part IV.C.
3ee See supra Part IV.A.4.
307 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010); see supra Part V.A.1.
Inevitably, however, people who do own their own computers and smart phones will
occasionally use office equipment to communicate on private matters.
308 There are those among us who have renounced privacy and have chosen to share
intimate details of their lives on the Internet, and some who, to the extent possible, live
in front of video cameras. For my own rather dyspeptic view of these developments, see
Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations and the Media, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1511-15 (2004).
309 This assumes that the average fully employed person is awake seventeen hours
a workday and spends roughly 8.5 hours on the job. Given that many employees are
now electronically accessible for work-related matters during their supposedly "off'
hours, the latter estimate may be low.
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Not so long ago, Congress had the interest and energy to
consider issues like these, and the ability to make the difficult
choices and compromises necessary to resolve them.310
Unfortunately Congress in 2012 has not displayed any of these
characteristics, and there is little immediate reason for confidence
that it will soon acquire them. The likely result is that individual
privacy in the workplace will erode, quietly, bit by bit, without the
public attention and study the matter deserves. Although the
Court was correct in declining to issue a broad, sweeping decision,
the decision had done little to reverse or impede that erosion.
APPENDIX. QUON: A USER'S MANUAL
The Court's restraint in Quon, however appropriate it may
have been under the circumstances, leaves litigators and lower
courts with significant questions as to how to proceed in new cases
that arise involving workplace privacy. The outline that follows
may prove useful in any attempts to follow the holding in Quon,
when a government employee sues, alleging that the agency for
which he or she worked violated his or her workplace privacy
under the Fourth Amendment. I make no claim that it is an "open
sesame" that will ineluctably lead to a winning argument or
reversal-proof decision. I hope, however, that it will give litigants
and courts a structure that will assure that all relevant issues and
arguments are considered.
A. Determine whether the investigation clearly did, or clearly
did not, intrude into an employee's (E) reasonable expectation
of privacy
Logically, the first issue to address is whether a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment occurred at all. If it did not, then E
310 Congress did so in 1968, when it enacted Title III, and in 1986 when it enacted
the Electric Communications Privacy Act, and has amended each statute several times
since, as in the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation. Congress did likewise
when it enacted the many provisions designed to protect computer integrity and




has no Fourth Amendment claim,3 11 and is unlikely to have a
common law invasion of privacy claim under state law, either.
Often this issue is easy to resolve applying both the O'Connor
plurality and Scalia concurrence approaches.
1. Some information-gathering methods clearly are
intrusions. Examples: physically searching E's desk, file
drawers, office, and personal property within E's office;3 12
concealing a microphone or camera in E's private workspace,
without advance notice to E.313 If there clearly was a Fourth
Amendment search or a tort law intrusion, proceed to Part C.
2. Some information-gathering methods clearly are not
intrusions. Examples: a supervisor standing in the hallway
overheard what E said in his office. As Justice Stewart said in
Katz, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." 314 The same is probably true if E negligently
exposed the information-for example, by leaving personal
documents in the company photocopier.315 If no such
intrusion occurred, then render judgment for the defendant
on the Fourth Amendment and pendant intrusion upon
solitude claims. 316
3. If (as in Quon) it is unclear whether the agency's actions
intruded into E's reasonable expectation of privacy, the court
should then consider whether, as in Quon, it can duck that
issue by assuming there was such an intrusion, and
evaluating whether that intrusion was reasonable under the
circumstances. See Part C, infra. If, as in Quon, the answer to
311 Because the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches
and seizures, if no "search" has occurred, see supra Part I.A.1, plaintiff has no Fourth
Amendment basis on which to complain.
312 See supra Part II.B.
313 In O'Connor, a majority of the Court concluded that, barring unusual
circumstances, an employee does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her
office. See supra Part II.B. Surreptitious electronic surveillance of private space is a per
se intrusion into that expectation. Electronic surveillance issues are discussed further
in Part D and E of this appendix.
314 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
31s There is no reason that the Fourth Amendment or tort law should protect
someone from his or her own negligence or inattention.
s16 If the agency made improper use of the information, plaintiff may still have state
law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, etc. See supra notes 244-46.
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the latter question is "Yes," then judgment is rendered for the
defendant as to the Fourth Amendment and intrusion upon
solitude claims.
4. If it is necessary to resolve the reasonable expectation of
privacy issue, move on to Part B.
B. Resolving whether the agency intruded upon E's reasonable
expectation of privacy-in general
A number of factors must be considered, including:
1. Did the agency have a published policy concerning privacy
or monitoring that covered its conduct in the case?
a. How widely publicized was it; did E have actual or, at
least, constructive notice?
b. Does the policy clearly incorporate the type of
monitoring, review or surveillance that was conducted in
E's case?
c. Was E given any "unofficial" or "off-the-record"
assurance that the policy would not apply in his or her
situation?
d. Do compelling factual or social policy reasons exist for
ruling that E had a reasonable expectation of privacy
despite being on notice that he or she did not?
2. Assuming the issue is not resolved in Part B.1:
a. Apply the O'Connor plurality approach. Given "[t]he
operational realities of the workplace,"31 7 did E have a
subjective expectation of privacy against the investigative
conduct by the agency? If so, is that expectation one
society accepts as reasonable? Useful sources include
leading treatises on the Fourth Amendment.
b. Apply Scalia's O'Connor-Quon concurrence approach,
i.e., the law governing the tort of intrusion upon solitude
in the workplace, which differs little from the O'Connor
317 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717.
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plurality approach set forth in the preceding
paragraph. 318
C. If there was an intrusion into E's reasonable expectation of
privacy: Determine whether the intrusion was reasonable (or
unreasonable) as a matter of law, or whether that is an issue
for the jury.
Reasonableness is based on a variety of factors:
1. The goals and subject matter of the agency's investigation
of E.
a. If the agency conducted its search or inquiry to enable
it to fulfill its public policy responsibilities, a plausible
argument exists (for whichever party it favors) that only
the O'Connor two-step approach should apply, because
(the argument goes), the case falls into a different "special
needs" category than the employer-employee category.
Example: the urine sample tests for law enforcement
officials upheld in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab.3 19
b. If the agency E worked for is not a law enforcement
agency and the search was initiated and conducted by a
law enforcement agency seeking evidence of criminal
conduct, then the traditional Fourth Amendment
requirements (probable cause that a crime was committed
and, probably, a search warrant), not the "special needs"
standard, should apply.320
c. If the agency E worked for is not a law enforcement
agency and E was suspected of conduct that might be
criminal but the search was conducted by the agency for
318 Useful sources include L. CAMILLE HEBERT, 1 EMP. PRIVACY LAW § 8:13;
RICHARD E. KAYE, CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INVASION OF PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYEE'S PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION, 42 CAUSE OF ACTION 2D
255 §§ 4-5 (2007); and, once it is published, chapter seven of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW. No doubt there are others.
319 489 U.S. 656 (1989). See supra note 122 for further discussion of Von Raab.
320 Note that this applies only if E has established that what was done constitutes a
search. If E was on notice that he had no expectation of privacy in his office e-mails, for
example, the fact that the agency turned them over to a law enforcement official who
requested them does not create an expectation of privacy in those messages.
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which he worked, the presumption should be that the
primary purpose of the investigation is to further
administrative or workplace goals, in which case the
"special needs" rule set forth in C.1.d, infra, should apply.
d. If the investigation was clearly intended to further
workplace goals unrelated to broader public policy
concerns and did not involve allegedly criminal activity,
apply both the O'Connor plurality approach and Justice
Scalia's tort-and-employment law approach to each
information-gathering method which intruded into E's
reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Applying the O'Connor plurality approach:
a. Assess how important it was to the agency to obtain the
information, how important it was to obtain the
information promptly, and (where applicable) how
important it was to obtain the information without notice
to E. Within these parameters, afford high importance as
to whether the agency's actions were an "efficient and
expedient way" to obtain the needed information. 321
b. Assess whether E's expectation of privacy was
extensive, or only limited. Quon and O'Connor provide
examples at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Compare
what the Court categorized as Sgt. Quon's only limited (at
best) reasonable expectation of privacy in his text
messages, because as a police officer he should have
known that they could be reviewed for a variety of
reasons, 322 with Dr. Ortega's obvious and quite strong
expectation of privacy in his office, desk and file drawers,
particularly items that were obviously non-work-related
papers and highly personal. 323
c. Consider whether, when they conducted their search,
the investigators reasonably expected to come across
highly personal information, or not. If they reasonably did
not expect to discover highly personal information, this is
321 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2631 (2010).
322 See supra Part III.E.2.
323 See supra Part II.B.
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a significant factor in favor of reasonableness, even if they
in fact learned highly personal information as a result. 324
d. The availability of less intrusive means is not, of itself,
a controlling consideration (except, perhaps, in extreme
cases), and a litigant or judge should say so three or four
times to make it clear that the writer 325 knows that this
is not a controlling consideration; 326 but it is a relevant
consideration nevertheless. If a litigant or judge cites
these other means, however, he or she should include a
factually specific discussion as to whether each of these
means would have enabled the agency to obtain the
equivalent information with equal, or nearly equal,
efficiency.
e. Did the agency make reasonable attempts to minimize
the intrusion at the outset, and (if applicable) after they
realized that they were discovering highly personal
information?
(1) Did the searchers restrict where they looked, or
how intensely they read or listened or watched?
O'Connor and Quon again provide useful contrasts.
In O'Connor, hospital employees examined, and
seized, obviously personal items in which the
hospital had no legitimate interest; 32 7 in Quon, the
OPD requested transcripts of only two months of
Sgt. Quon's text messages, 328 and the Internal
Affairs officer assigned to the case read only the
transcripts of messages Sgt. Quon sent and
received while on duty.329
(2) If the searchers seized personal items of E that
were of no legitimate interest to the agency, how
long did the agency retain them before returning
them? A court should not expect instantaneous
324 The Court so held in Quon. See supra Part III.E.2.
325 I mean here, the attorney writing a brief or the judge writing an opinion.
326 I exaggerate here for effect. If the court in question is the Ninth Circuit, it
should raise the ante to at least a dozen times. See supra note 189.
121 See supra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text.
328 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
329 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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evaluation and return of personal items that get
swept up in the search, but prolonged retention
aggravates the degree of intrusion. 330
(3) How many individuals were given access to
personal information that was discovered during
the search, and what use (if any) was made of such
information? Once again, O'Connor and Quon
provide useful contrasts. In O'Connor, the hospital
used obviously personal information gleaned from
the search to impeach Dr. Ortega's witnesses at
trial;331 in Quon, it appears that no unnecessary
disclosures about the text messages occurred.332
f. In some cases, it will be clear, as a matter of law, that the
agency's intrusion into E's privacy was reasonable.3 3 3 In
others, it will be clear as a matter of law, that the agency's
intrusion into E's privacy was unreasonable. 334
330 See supra note 101.
331 See supra note 101.
332 See supra text accompanying note 195.
333 The Supreme Court so held in Quon. See supra Part III.E.2.
3 See, e.g., Richards v. Los Angeles, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
The L.A. Department of Public Works received an anonymous tip that one dispatcher,
Richards, had engaged in sexual intercourse with a visitor when she was assigned,
alone, to the dispatch room at night. Id. at 1179. To investigate this allegation, a
camera was hidden in the dispatch room-a location with a locked door, no windows,
and limited access, particularly at night, when the building was largely deserted. Id. at
1179-80 (The judge ruled that the circumstances gave dispatchers a reasonable
expectation of privacy, id. at 1182, which seems correct given the facts.). The camera
ran continuously for more than two months (until it was discovered by a dispatcher),
recording the conduct of every dispatcher during that period. Id. at 1181. Dispatchers,
when they were on duty alone, "engaged in a number of private acts in the dispatch
room," including changing their clothing, pumping breast milk, picking zits, "and ...
other acts normally reserved for private spaces." Id. at 1180. The officer assigned to
watch the videos was instructed to check out the behavior of all of the dispatchers, not
just Richards's. Id. After the discovery of the cameras, the dispatchers sued. Id. at
1881. The judge held that the surveillance of the rest of the dispatchers (who were
suspected of no wrongdoing) was per se unreasonable, and granted them summary
judgment on that issue, a ruling that seems completely indisputable. Id. at 1185 (The
judge held likewise for Richards--that ruling strikes me as somewhat debatable.).
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g. In some cases, however, reasonableness under the
circumstances will be a contested issue of fact, for the jury
to resolve.3 35
3. Apply Justice Scalia's tort-and-employment law approach:
a. All of the factors in C.2.a through C.3.e logically would
be relevant here, as well.
b. The ultimate question of fact, however, is somewhat
different, or at least must be worded differently, because
to succeed in a tort suit for intrusion upon seclusion,
plaintiff must establish that, given all the circumstances,
"the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."3 36
D. Special circumstances-Claims involving "real-time"
electronic surveillance: intercepting "wire, oral, or electronic
communications"; video surveillance
1. Apply Parts A, B, and C, supra.
2. Keep in mind as well that if the employer's conduct
constituted the "interception" (in essence, real-time
monitoring, or recording) of the "contents" of a "wire, oral or
electronic communication" by means of any "device," the
conduct may constitute a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§2511(1), and may also be civilly actionable pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §2520, independent of any Fourth Amendment or
common law claim.33 7
3. By contrast, there is no federal law that punishes or
regulates the use of video surveillance. Thus, if such
surveillance involved observation or recording only of E's
physical conduct, without audio, a federal cause of action can
3 The Supreme Court so held in O'Connor. See supra note 101.
336 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652B; see supra Part IV.A.3. Useful sources are
suggested supra note 318.
133 Each of the terms in quotation marks is defined in 18 U.S.C § 2510 (2006). For
the definitions and their implications, see generally FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note
10, ch. 2. Many states have enacted similar statutes. For a detailed examination of
crimes and civil actions relating to communications privacy, see id., ch. 3. See also
JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (2011),
which also provides exhaustive coverage of these issues.
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only be predicated on the Fourth Amendment, not on any
federal statute.3 3 8
E. Claims involving review of stored electronic communications
or use of office computers
1. Apply Parts A, B, and C, supra.
2. If the employer's conduct constituted unlawful accessing of
stored electronic communications in violation of the SCA, the
conduct may also constitute a crime in violation of 18 USC
§2701(a), and may also be civilly actionable pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2707, independent of any Fourth Amendment or
common law claim. 339
3. If the employer's conduct involved surveillance of the
employee's use of a computer, that may also provide a basis
for a cause of action.340
4. Regarding the Stored Communications Act and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: if you are in the Ninth
Circuit, Theofel and Quon v. Arch Wireless are controlling
law; otherwise, although a party may cite them as persuasive
authority, hopefully the judge will wisely decline to follow
them. 341
338 For extensive coverage of these issues, see FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 10,
ch. 30.
339 See generally id. ch. 7; see also CARR & BELLIA, supra note 337 (also providing
extensive coverage of these issues); Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored
Communications Act-And a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208 (2004).
340 See generally ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW (2d ed. 2009); FISHMAN &
McKENNA, supra note 10, chs. 21-27, which includes an exhaustive examination of all
federal and state legislation on the subject.
341 See supra note 158.
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